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     This is a compilation of essays and comments prepared for the international 
seminar “Polish- Jewish Relations and Anti-Semitism in Interwar Poland” held at 
Kyoto University on January 7 and 8, 2018. The seminar was organized as a 
sequel to the international workshop “Yiddishism and the Creation of the Yiddish 
Nation” held in January 2017. This was part of the research project “Research 
Trend Investigations in Humanities Studies and the Formulation of Research 
Promotion Policies” (research representative: Mari Nomura), which was 
subsidized by the Research Center for Science Systems of Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science.  
     In this seminar we focused on the rise of radical anti-Semitism in interwar 
Poland and on the reactions of Jewish youths to it. An animated discussion was 
held on the ideological, political, social and religious characteristics of Polish 
anti-Semitism. I would like to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt 
gratitude to the lecturers who prepared the seminar papers, discussants, all 
seminar participants, and everyone who cooperated in realizing this seminar. I 
expect that research on the social and cultural history of Eastern European Jews 







The International Seminar on Polish-Jewish Relations  
and Anti-Semitism in Interwar Poland: Aims and Scope 
 
Yuu Nishimura  
 
The international seminar, “Polish-Jewish Relations and anti-Semitism in 
Interwar Poland,” held in January 2018, was organized as a sequel to the seminar, 
“Yiddishism and Creation of the Yiddish Nation,” held in January 2017.1 Both 
events aimed at deepening the understanding of East European Jewish history and 
expanding the scope of Jewish studies in Japan.  
For decades, studies on European Jews have attracted a significant amount 
of attention in Japan. Until relatively recently, however, studies on Jews in 
Eastern Europe have been overshadowed by research predominantly focusing on 
Western European Jews. In the first seminar, “Yiddishism and Creation of the 
Yiddish Nation,” we focused on Yiddishism, a variety of Eastern European Jewish 
nationalism that sought to establish a modern national identity and national 
community of Jews based on a common language, Yiddish. We explored 
Yiddishist ideas and the early history of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, 
an embodiment of the Yiddishist dream of a national academy for the Yiddish 
nation. In this, the second seminar, “Polish-Jewish Relations,” we tried to step 
further in the direction of expanding the scope to the history of Eastern European 
Jews, and to include their relationships with the surrounding population.  
We established three goals for this seminar in connection with the previous 
seminar. First, we sought to shift the focus from the ideologies of Jewish political 
leaders or nationalist activists to the everyday experiences of ordinary Jews. 
Having Kamil Kijek as a lecturer was fascinating; his work on Polish Jewish 
youth in the interwar years, based on an analysis of a hundred autobiographies 
collected by YIVO during the autobiography contests it held in the 1930s, 
illuminates this aspect.2  
The second goal was to delve into the relations between Jews and their 
Polish neighbors. This was a subject not satisfactorily covered in the previous 
seminar, but is obviously essential in analyzing the course of Jewish nationalism 
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and its influence on the Jewish society in general.     
Whenever we attempt to investigate Polish-Jewish relations, there is an 
issue that can never be avoided: the question of anti-Semitism. The study of 
anti-Semitism as a general research field is not new in Japan, and has a relatively 
long history accompanied by many works including Japanese translation of some 
essential sources from other countries. The specific issue of anti-Semitism in 
Poland, or Polish anti-Semitism, however, remains almost unknown. Therefore, 
Polish anti-Semitism became a central issue for us, and to learn the latest 
approaches to studying it was the third goal in this seminar. Grzegorz Krzywiec, 
whose splendid work on Roman Domowski describes Polish anti-Semitism in 
conjunction with Polish nationalism, seemed a perfect choice as lecturer.3  
How did the ordinary Jews in Poland, Europe’s largest concentration of 
Jewish population at that time, live during the difficult era on the eve of WWII? 
How did Jews relate to their Polish neighbors and how did Poles relate to Jews? I 
hope the seminar did, and that this publication will, lead us to new insights into 
both Jewish and Polish history and promote further studies in this field.   
 
＊  ＊  ＊ 
The two-day seminar was held at Kyoto University. Participants included 
researchers and students of Polish or Jewish history as well as specialists of other 
Central and Eastern European countries. Researchers in other fields, such as 
literature and philosophy as they relate to either Jews or Poles, also participated.  
The first day was devoted to the theme: “Dynamics of Modern 
Polish-Jewish Relations.” Krzywiec’s talk led us to the crucial period in the 
emergence of modern anti-Semitism in Poland, i.e., the era after the 1905 
revolution, a period marked by the advent of mass politics and growing 
nationalism among both Poles and Jews. Kijek followed the relationship between 
these two groups in the context of the Second Polish Republic, a newly born 
nation-state, which held the promise of equal rights for all its citizens, but in 
reality betrayed it by prioritizing the ethnically and religiously defined “Polish 
nation” over other ethnic groups. Universal education among others made this 
paradox perceivable for both Polish and Jewish youth and exerted profound 
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influence on their changing mutual relationships.  
The theme for the second day was “Anti-Jewish Violence on the Eve of 
WWII.” Here we focused on the pogroms that occurred in Polish provinces in the 
1930s. Krzywiec demonstrated the process by which anti-Semitism, accompanied 
by physical violence, became part of the culture of the broader Polish right wing 
and was eventually absorbed by the post-Piłsudski Sanacja regime. Kijek’s talk, a 
case study of the Kielce voivodeship, clarified the mechanics how modern 
anti-Semitism, originally an urban phenomenon promoted by intellectuals, 
penetrated into the peasant population in the countryside. Both talks pointed to 
the existence of the well-devised political plan of the Polish radical right wing 
that combined its anti-regime political strategies with radical anti-Semitism and 
that consequently led to the eruption of the violent pogroms. 
All lectures were followed by comments from discussants (Shigechika 
Suzuki, Haruka Miyazaki, Hisashi Shigematsu, and Yuu Nishimura). The 
comments printed in this volume were prepared from the lecturers’ preliminary 
papers that had been submitted before the seminar. The lecturers’ papers in this 
volume were revised after the seminar.  
I would like to take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to the 
lecturers, discussants, and all seminar participants. Special thanks are due to 
Satoshi Koyama (Kyoto University) for kindly offering the venue and to Taro 
Tsurumi (The University of Tokyo) for gracefully assuming the role of moderator. 
The success of this seminar with its lively discussions owed much to his skillful 
and insightful moderation. 
                                                     
1 Yuu Nishimura and Mari Nomura eds., Yiddishism and Creation of the Yiddish Nation: 
Proceedings of the International Workshop (Kanazawa, 2017). This proceedings is available 
online at Kanazawa University Repository for Academic Recourses: 
https://kanazawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp  
2 Kamil Kijek, Dzieci modernizmu: Świadomość i socjalizacja polityczna młodzieży żydowskiej 
w Polsce międzywojennej (Wrocław, 2017). 
3 Grzegorz Krzywiec, Chauvinism, Polish Style: The Case of Roman Dmowski (Beginnings: 
1886–1905) (Frankfurt am Mein, 2016). See also idem, Polska bez Żydów: Studia z dziejów 
idei, wyobrażeń i praktyk antysemickich na ziemiach polskich początku XX wieku (1905–
1914) (Warszawa, 2017). Krzywiec and Kijek served as co-editors of the special issue of 
Kwartalnik Historii Żydów [Quarterly of Jewish History] 28 (258) (2016) devoted to the 


















A Clash of Two Nations? 
The Post-1905 Revolution Trauma, the Rise of the Polish Jews  
and the Founding Myths of Polish Modern Anti-Semitism 
 
Grzegorz Krzywiec  
 
The 1905 Revolution in Russian Poland: Enthusiasm, Shock and Trauma 
The events of 1905, the so called the First Russian Revolution brought to 
light the stark division of social and political life in Russian Poland and then in 
the Polish land. Never before then had the imagination of the conservative part of 
Polish society been so deeply haunted by the spectre of a violent revolt fomented 
by a socialist-Jewish plot. Fears of the overturning of the natural order, along with 
suspicions and anxieties over the future of the national community were common 
amongst both the middle and higher classes – which is to say, the social and 
cultural establishment as a whole – and therefore the imagined figure of the 
Jewish revolutionary perfectly embodied these phobias. The ‘First Russian 
Revolution’ was very significant for the Polish political and social scene, even 
though few at the time were ready to acknowledge that at the outset1.  
In this regard the vision of a disciplined society governed by a ‘national 
organization’ as defined by Roman Dmowski and his political fellows seems to 
have offered some Poles hope for a genuine barrier against the chaos of 
revolution, anarchy, mass strikes, and above all the appearance of mobs on the 
streets and, first and foremost, the rise of the Jewish community2. Dmowski, the 
principle ideologue and political leader of National Democracy (Endecja, the first 
and biggest nationalist party in Polish lands – its members were usually called 
national democrats or shortly Endeks), also presented his vision as the only way 
to preserve Polish national identity in times of deep crisis and political and first 
and foremost social upheavals3.  
There can be no doubt that radical anti-Semitism based on racial thinking 
was central from the very beginning to Dmowski’s ideological project4. What is 
even far more interesting is how and to what extent he efficiently added to his 
agenda new political slogans. Dmowski first proclaimed his views and ideas in a 
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collection of essays entitled the ‘Thoughts of a Modern Pole’ (Myśli 
nowoczesnego Polaka, 1903), wherein racial Social Darwinism was intermingled 
with a project for the modernization of the nation. Then when he got back from 
his journey to Japan (1905), deeply impressed by ethnic homogeneity of the latter, 
the leader of the national democrats added some new elements to his ideological 
framework: most of all a vision of a racial anarchy in which the Jews as the most 
racially alienated and hostile element wanted to appropriate the revolution in 
order to dominate the Christian environment5. To be sure, however, anti-Semitism 
was not a key to the Endeks’ success during the revolution and shortly afterwards. 
The ‘Jewish’ question’ in the Endeks’ rhetoric and political strategy had there 
only secondary status6. Nonetheless, at the very outset the nationalist movement 
attained the status of a mass movement, but not so much through the agency of 
the National Democracy (ND) as a political party, but rather than due to the 
effective leadership of a coalition of vested interests.  
By the end of 1905 the party had become the strongest mass political 
movement (ca. 50.000 members) in Russian Poland. At this time the Endeks’ 
political structure was orchestrated by a handful of people, namely Dmowski and 
his inner circle, who paved the way to the creation of the first genuine political 
and propaganda war machine in Polish lands. In the early months of 1906 that 
machine with sophisticated party organization and its own nationwide press 
system would spread over nearly the entire country and go on to win a 
comprehensive victory in Congress Poland’s first elections (1906) to the Russian 
State Duma7. The electoral victory of the nationalists was bound to lead to a 
fierce confrontation between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces. 
What became crucial, if not decisive to the Endeks’ success at this stage was, as 
one may assume, the political plan for challenging the Revolution as a case of 
violent anarchy from the left and an apocalyptic act against Christian order and, 
secondly, the nationalists’ adroit management of counter-revolutionary fears and 
anxieties.  
The early peak of this new mass politics in Russian Poland, a mixture of 
anti-socialist scaremongering and disciplinary rhetoric with some anti-Jewish 
motifs, may be said to have taken place in the Lodz (Łódź) uprising of 1906-1907. 
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For the very first time this new attitude turned from ideological and rhetoric battle 
in the press to a local civil war, and in the biggest industrial city in central 
Congress Poland. Much has been written about those events. Here it is 
worthwhile recalling just the simple facts and figures. In the rebellion of Łódź, 
from autumn 1906 to spring 1907, no less than 400 people were killed and many 
others wounded in fratricidal assassinations between rightist paramilitary squads 
inspired by the Endeks’ political message and leftist activists from various circles. 
Dmowski, as the editor-in-chief of the main nationalist daily of the time (the 
Polish Gazette – Gazeta Polska), a capital ship of the campaign, was a crucial 
instigator and key personality behind the anti-socialist hysteria in the nationalist 
press. For the Endecja in the first decade of new century the exclusion of all ‘non-
Polish’ groups from the national collectivity meant an uncompromising fight 
against them until their complete, both political and moral de-legitimization. In 
extreme cases this could lead to physical elimination.  
Surely, the events of 1905-1907 empowered Dmowski’s personal standing 
within the nationalist camp and among conservative public opinion, last but not 
least among Catholic middle classes. Indeed, it was not only the successes of the 
Endecja in elections (once in 1906 and twice in 1907) that demonstrated that 
nationalist ideas and disciplinary visions and phantasms had gained broad 
acceptance among Polish voters and amongst the general public. The leader of the 
National Democracy, as someone who had taken part in putting the Revolution 
down, was treated by some sections of the general public as a charismatic leader, 
one ready to assume responsibility for the whole country and the ‘Polish cause’ as 
such. Hand in hand with the acknowledgement of his role among the ranks of 
Endeks, a group of nationalist activists was formed in his camp. These people 
were strictly subordinated to him, and hence dubbed ‘Dmowski-ites’. What is yet 
most interesting, they all became the moving power of all the Endecja’s later 
political and above all anti-Semitic propaganda campaigns.  
After 1905 the political anti-Semitism of the National Democracy reached 
many aspects. First and the foremost, anti-Jewish slogans had a practical value 
that could mobilize some parts of society in Congress Poland against the Left and 
progressivist circles. The Endeks at this time effectively used those slogans not 
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only against the Jewish community as a whole, but in order to fight the Left and 
the Centre, and even the conciliatory, conservative circles, so called the Realists8. 
What is most striking is how rapidly and to what extent they adopted a negative 
disposition towards the Jews. This rhetoric linked all the roles of the ‘enemy 
within’ with the Jewish community. During elections to the Russian Duma, in the 
spring of 1907, the Endeks became even more radical and aggressive in their 
attitude towards the Jews, and began using political anti-Semitism as an 
instrument in their active fight against any opposition 9 . The Jews began to 
epitomize in this rhetoric all forms of aggression against Polishness, and the 
National Democracy nominated itself the sole depository and defender of Polish 
values – and the tactic worked very effectively. 
 
The ‘Jewish revolution’: the 1905 and the rise of the East European Jewry 
One has in mind, however, that the 1905 Revolution had a tremendous 
effect on the Jewish communities under the Tsarist rule as well10. There were at 
least a couple of significant waves of that rise which in fact reconfigured and then 
constituted the identity of the Polish Jewry of this time. A few phenomenon needs, 
though, special consideration in this regard. When in January 1905 a special 
Empire committee established to reform press law started its proceedings in St. 
Petersburg, the editors of nearly every newspaper in Russian Poland much as 
great many book editors had requested the abolition of the preventative 
censorship. And then effects were almost immediate. In early 1906 official state 
statistics noticed the appearance of over 160 new press titles throughout the 
Kingdom of Poland, of which as many as 100 were newspapers in Warsaw11. A 
significant percentage of these were albeit Yiddish publications. Most of the 
names of theirs editors marked the milstones in the history of modern Jewish 
press: Noah Finkelshteyn, Noah Pryłucki, Shmuel Yatskan and many, many 
others. All they came under revolutionary times, however. E.g. St. Petersburg 
originated but mostly in Warsaw distributed daily Der Veg (The Road), was 
suspended in October 1905 just after a couple of months of internal conflict on 
the editorial board, permanent fights with the Tsarist censorship and a generally 
revolutionary turmoil just to appear again under the same name by the end of 
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following month. The daily reached a circulation over 10,000 copies in the days 
of the opening of the First State Duma (spring 1906). Another daily which started 
up in Warsaw as such as an effect of transformations and evolutions of many 
various titles, Haynt (Today) (1908) introduced into the Jewish culture a new 
format: modern layout on the front page, with a division among headlines and 
columns, all these allowed new readers easily to recognize the papers’ content12. 
This new world reached in months mass circulation growing up to more than 
20,000. In some sense, the Yiddish press played crucial role in the development 
of the new Jewish identity. Moreover the editors of the press began to perform a 
role, which they had assigned to themselves: they prepared Jewish masses for 
existing in a modern nation-state13. As a result of the 1905 Revolution, as Scott 
Ury pointed out, ‘the center of Jewish community and politics had passed from 
the gmina building to the editor’s desk’14. And the editors and journalists became 
out of the blue both spokesmen and teachers of the Jewish masses. 
Similar effect brought forth explosion of the new Jewish theatre. During 
the 1905 Revolution various Yiddish companies flocked to Warsaw and some 
other Russian Poland cities and began to perform at different locations. Some of 
them were the first ventures in intention to stage Jewish play in Polish for 
primarily Jewish audience. But for many others this was a part of a plan to enable 
Jewish audience to experience a new Yiddish theatre. Although throughout 
Eastern Europe professional and amateur Yiddish drama had arisen and flourished, 
Warsaw became for the next three decades the centre of the Jewish theatre. In fact 
then theatres, mass-circulation press and other cultural venues were only part of 
the larger development of a new phenomenon that appeared together with the 
Revolution: a modern Jewish popular culture focused on masses which in 
Warsaw and other cities came into being virtually overnight. This new Yiddish 
mass-circulation phenomenon, a kind of socio-cultural revolution among the 
Jewish community awoke among contemporaries various intense reactions. E.g. 
the popularity of the Yiddish mass-circulation press aroused distaste and shock 
among the milieux of the integrated Polish Jews. As Kalman Weiser, historian of 
the Jewish popular culture once noticed, ‘the very notion of a modern Jewish in 
Yiddish was simultanously oxymornic and menacing, an open challenge to the 
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supremacy of the Polish language and culture on Polish soil’15. No doubt, all that 
was received by the Polish public with a growing skepticism. The Jewish political 
and cultural activists almost overnight became anti-heros in the Polish 
imagination16.  
  
‘Anti-Litvak’ hysteria as a case study of the demographic panic, mass media 
consensus and nationalist scaremongering campaign 
When in the spring of 1910 nationalists became the actual winner of the 
Third Russian Duma, reactionary and chauvinist tendencies began getting the 
upper hand not only in the Russian establishment. A wave of cultural pessimism 
spread all over the Russian Empire and dominated public debates. Undoubtedly, 
this was the outcome of Stolypin’s reaction, the ruthless and merciless fight 
against the revolutionary movement, but it was also the outcome of the 
government’s struggle against the liberal Left and local national movements 
within the Empire. The various chauvinist slogans such as ‘one, undivided 
Russia’, and ‘Russia for the Russians’ proclaimed by the Right coincided with the 
meticulous and behind-the-scenes activities of the Tsarist administration. As early 
as May 1910 the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs submitted to the Duma a 
project for municipal self-government, and in the autumn it came up eventually 
for debate. 
The question that greatly stirred and then went wild Polish public opinion 
firstly in Russian Poland then in the end in all three partitions, was one of creating 
a new administrative guberniya outside the borders of the former Congress 
Poland called the ‘Chełm project’. The project was received by Poles of various 
political viewpoints and strands as a new partition. The matter had also been 
instrumentally delayed by the Tsarist bureaucracy17. After Russian Prime Minister 
Peter Stolypin was assassinated (September 1911), the project for municipal self-
government ended, and in fact it had never come into force. The Prime Minister’s 
death in a terrorist bomb attack affected the whole Russian political scene in other 
ways, as well. The Tsarist administration decided to lash out at the Jewish 
community by forcing them into emigration. Some of this ‘tide’ of refugees 
(known as Litvaks) came to Congress Poland – and Polish public opinion was 
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more than horrified. However, Stolypin’s assassination did not change the general 
nationalist trend in Russian policy. And to be sure nothing irritated patriotic 
feelings at this time of crisis as much as uncertainty. Polish patriotic anxieties of 
the first decades of 20th Century heightened by the adverse moves of the 
partitioning powers sought an outlet. This powerful sense of threat to the Polish 
cause, fears of uncertainty shared by many contemporaries on one hand was 
accompanied by a rise of patriotic feeling, connected in part with the nationalist 
persecution of the Polish population in Prussia, and in part with the general 
international unrest, which many saw as a prelude to a European-wide conflict on 
the other hand18. This was as well the atmosphere in which the celebrations of the 
500th anniversary of the First Battle of Tannenberg (Grunwald) – the biggest 
Middle Ages battle against German-Prussian Teutonic Knights widely recognized 
among Poles as a symbol of victory over Germaneness – were held in July 1910. 
What recurred then, side by side with the widespread anti-German feelings, were 
the even stronger ‘anti-Litvak’ phobias among Poles19. 
From 1909, but especially from 1910 onwards these surges of feelings were 
dynamically and radically growing20. Thus, for example, the Council of Polish 
Progressive Union (Polskie Zjednoczenie Postępowe), the main centre-left party 
claimed at a closed-door debate that the non-assimilated Jew should be treated as 
‘an internal enemy’ of the whole Polish nation21 . Thus, Leon Wasilewski, a 
leading ideologue of the Polish Socialist Party - Revolutionary Faction (Polska 
Partia Socjalistyczna - Frakcja Rewolucyjna – PPS-FR), the independentist 
socialist party warned in the same manner: ‘Litvakism’ is an abnormal, 
pathological, reactionary symptom, just as pathological and reactionary as its 
reasons’ 22 . Warnings and scaremongering against the Litvaks recurred 
systematically in the press of the Party of Real Politics (Stronnictwo Polityki 
Realnej), a principal conservative party, which at this time was nearly free of 
popular anti-Semitism 23 . And these stirrings and currents were merely the 
beginnings of the huge anti-Semitic tide, likely one of the most drastic rhetoric 
campaign against the Jews in Polish public life in the early 20th century. 
What seemed to be most surprising even to contemporaries was that these 
aggressive anti-Jewish phraseology and images were spreading overwhelmingly 
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among the socialist and leftist milieux24. The aforementioned Leon Wasilewski, a 
noted linguist and an expert on minority questions as well, a close fellow of Józef 
Piłsudski and one of the most prominent activist of Polish Socialist Party noticed 
that anti-Semitic impulses were growing rapidly among those socialists who 
strove for the independence of Poland. The party propaganda now adopted new 
anti-Semitic motifs and elements. For instance, the terms such as a ‘Levite’ – an 
adherent of the PPS Left (PPS-Lewica), the left wing of the Polish socialist 
movement – and ‘social-Litvakism’ appeared as descriptions for ‘Jewish 
nationalism in a socialist guise’25. The fierce polemic between the fighters for 
Poland’s independence and the socialist Left had gone on for years, but now 
arguments with an appearance of factuality were ousted by anti-Semitic 
generalizations. 
Juljan Unszlicht was another infamous author of long pamphlets on this 
theme26. His essays appeared in the Independent Thought (Myśl Niepodległa), the 
progressivist daily Morning Courier (Kurier Poranny), but also in the socialist 
weekly Pre-dawn (Przedświt), and they were then reprinted by the main Galician 
socialist daily Forward (Naprzód) and the socialist weekly Workers’ Gazette 
(Gazeta Robotnicza), which appeared among the Polish diaspora in Berlin. All 
those were main socialist and left-radical Polish opinion-forming periodicals of 
the time. Unszlicht, a former international socialist, argued openly that another 
left-wing socialist group, the Social Democracy of Kingdom Poland and 
Lithuania (Socjaldemokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy – SDKPiL), was simply 
‘an emanation of petty-bourgeois Jewish nationalism’. In his fierce attack ‘W. 
Sendecki’ (Unszlicht’s pseudonym as a publicist) accused the leaders of the 
Social Democracy of being the ‘Litvak Targowica’, in reference to the 
Confederation of Targowica established by Polish magnates and aristocrats, 
widely acknowledged as traitors of Poland, who opposed the 3rd of May 1791 
Constitution in collusion with the Russian Empress Catherine II. He claimed they 
had provoked the violence of the partitioners and wished to subjugate the whole 
Polish nation. The overall atmosphere of fear of ‘the Litvak swarm’ reached its 
heights in the early autumn of 1910 when the attacks against the SDKPiL came to 
the knowledge of international socialist milieux27. 
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The year 1910 also marked a turning-point in the nationalist movement. 
Within this camp were found the most extreme anti-Semitic publicists of the time: 
Ignacy Oksza-Grabowski, a writer and contributor to many influential cultural 
periodicals, and Stanisław Pieńkowski. Both contributed to the ND press with 
sophisticated elaborations meant to unmask the ‘moral corruption’ of Polish 
culture by ‘the Jewish racial element’. Pieńkowski, a poet, a famous translator of 
Nietzsche’s works into Polish, and an apologist of mystic Aryanism soon became 
the leading cultural critic of the Warsaw Gazette (Gazeta Warszawska), the main 
nationalist daily in that period. For all those authors – and there are many others 
of a minor kind – the fight against the ‘Jewish threat’ meant something more than 
the mere ousting of the hostile and parasitical element from the Polish national 
community. Getting rid of the Jews was seen as a remedy for the illnesses of ‘the 
whole Aryan world’, as the destruction of the source of evil that pestered the 
contemporary Western world28. 
Although this anti-Jewish scaremongering was directed and managed 
above all by the National Democrats and the nationalist press, which cleverly 
turned the Jews into the universal enemy of Poles and the Polish cause, the tide 
that flowed chiefly through the Warsaw press had a much wider extent and built a 
sort of moral consensus between the main Polish political groups 29 . Some 
symbolic turning point could also be noticed in the Catholic press, which had 
earlier tried to moderate outspoken, especially racial-driven anti-Jewish ranting. 
The presence of overt and radical anti-Semites in the columns of the Catholic 
press became the order of the day then30. 
This anti-Litvak psychosis had gone far beyond the so-called ‘progressive 
anti-Semitism’, a trend symbolically connected with Andrzej Niemojewski, a 
leftist activist and noted poet, that was attached to the Left of the turn of the 
century31. Initially, the interests of this author in the Jewish question did not 
distinguish him from other progressives. His sporadic declarations in this regard 
located him among the adherents of the radical assimilation of Jews into 
Christianity. Up until 1905 he declared himself a friend of the Jews, which, 
according to him, on the one hand meant he was in favour of the complete 
integration of the Jewish population into Polish society, and on the other it 
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revealed his fascination with some elements of Jewish culture. In 1906 he 
established the periodical Myśl Niepodległa, which disclosed the paradoxes and 
inconsistencies of faith from the viewpoint of scientism. 
In 1909 there slowly emerged from among his not quite coherent views 
certain anti-Semitic motifs. At the time of the creation of the two most important 
Yiddish dailies, and the debate about national rights in the Duma, the Myśl 
Niepodległa waged a radical critique of Yiddish. The journal persistently repeated 
the clichés of that time, such as that Yiddish was an underdeveloped German 
serving everyday communication, but absolutely useless for the development of 
culture; or that there was no literature or even serious journalism in this language. 
Thus the year 1910 marked a qualitative point in Niemojewski’s writings as a 
publicist and public figure. This change could be noticed even in the September 
attack of Myśl Niepodległa on the SDKPiL. Its polemic with the social-
democratic press, not free of cavils and libels, triggered off a genuine avalanche 
of further accusations. The publicist specified: 1905 had been an important 
watershed in Polish history, as it signified a victory of the democratic idea that 
was thwarted by the Jews; their anti-Polish behaviour was the result of their caste 
character; they were not a nation, but an anachronistic racial-religious group of 
interest. As time went by, Niemojewski added new charges to these two 
accusations. In some sense, he did not say anything new: he just piled up more 
and more aggressive metaphors, which later took on their own life. On the eve of 
the First World War Niemojewski and his contributors were deeply absorbed by 
the racial and anthropological ties that allegedly connected the Jews, as well as by 
the ‘ethic of the Talmud’, which prevented any assimilation. 
Niemojewski’s ferocious attacks against the Jews were supported by 
another publicist well-known among the progressives – namely, Izabella (Iza) 
Moszczeńska. Her prolific contributions and commentaries from 1910 on in 
Kurier Poranny (a journal close to the progressives, but as well the unofficial 
tribune for the independentist socialists) turned ‘the Jewish question’ into the 
chief problem for the whole of educated Polish opinion32. In a more quiet tone, 
Moszczeńska argued that the presence of the Jewish population hampered the 
modernization of Polish society. 
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These tendencies found their reflection in popular culture. What appeared 
as a signum temporis was the popular anti-Semitic belle-lettres novels and 
fictions. The authors of those bestselling novels were generally absorbed by three 
problems: ‘the Prussian-Jewish plot’, ‘the Litvaks and Litvakism’, and eventually 
‘the boycott of the Jews’33. The literary critic, writer and above all the leading 
salonfähig anti-Semite Teodor Jeske-Choiński wrote about the leading exponent 
of this trend, Józef Weyssenhoff (the author, among other novels, of Political 
Days [Dni polityczne, 1910], and the Hetmans [Hetmani, 1911]), that ‘in Hetmani 
he broke away from the earlier tradition of writing about the Jews in local terms, 
and gave the picture of their general strivings’ 34 . About the Awakening 
(Przebudzenie) by Artur Gruszecki, a popular novelist e.g. of the Litvak Swarm 
(Litwackie mrowie, 1911), a contemporary critic says: ‘The Jew in this novel 
appears simply as a general category of threat and hatred, a personification of 
evil’35. 
In 1911 a tide of social tensions swept across the lands of the Russian 
partition. This coincided with the outbreak of Beilis’s anti-Semitic affair in Russia, 
but embraced even wider circles of local societies in the Russian Empire and re-
awoke medieval anti-Judaic myths, as well36. As the journalist Bernard Singer 
recalled about his childhood in Warsaw during those days: ‘Boys on the streets 
were already shouting ‘Beilis’ at bearded Jews’37. Moreover, in the long term the 
economic crisis of 1907-1909 finally came to affect one of the basic groups that 
made up the ND electorate – namely, the Christian bourgeoisie and small 
entrepreneurs. It was then, as Robert Blobaum says, that a conviction took root 
among the ‘Christian middle class’ that the presence of their Jewish competitors 
was the main factor hindering economic development38. 
By the end of 1909 and the beginning of 1910 in Congress Poland the anti-
Semitic jargon, with the Jew as the major threat to Poland, had entered the 
language and the imagination of the National Democrats completely and for good. 
Moreover, Dmowski wanted at every turn to define the Jews as an exotic and 
dangerous Asiatic race. He presented them and all their doings as the work of a 
parasite. ‘Parasitism’ as he once called it, was the genuine ideology of Jews. He 
emphasized that the Jews could simply not belong to the Polish nation. Ultimately, 
20 
he strove for the unification of all anti-Jewish thinking and ideologies under the 
Endeks’ banner39. The party and the Endek’s press propaganda machine in all 
partitions were actually ready for a final battle. 
However, in political praxis, the dynamic of anti-Semitic rhetoric should 
above all be connected with the rise of the Jewish community. A phenomenon 
that especially affected the form and intensity of anti-Semitic attitudes after the 
1905 Revolution was the migration of the Jews from Russia to the Congress 
Poland. Interestingly enough, resentments towards those groups were first voiced 
by the Polish Jews and reached Polish opinion from that angle. The enmity 
towards the Litvaks as a metaphor of the Jew-stranger with Russian roots was the 
only outlet for Russophobia openly permitted by the Tsarist system. Most Polish 
publications of the time viewed this Yiddish revival as either aggressive or 
provocative, the others as merely evasive. Although short-lived, the Litvak myth, 
together with the side-effects of the 1905 Revolution, had an enormous impact 
upon not only Polish anti-Semitism, but on the Polish politics as such. 
Thus seen from various perspectives it is very true, as the eminent Polish 
historian Jerzy Jedlicki once wrote, that by 1912 all the positions on this front had 
been taken and clearly delineated. Only the signal was missing40. And this was 
when the elections to the Forth Duma were to be announced. 
 
The 1912 IV Warsaw State Duma electoral campaign as a nationalist blitz and 
the founding milestones of the new Poland 
Quite a lot has already been written about the role of the elections to the 
Fourth Duma in 1912, the course they took, and their significance for Polish-
Jewish relations41. Before addressing some of this propaganda campaign, one 
should review the background to Polish-Jewish relations in Warsaw at the time. 
Fin-de-siècle Warsaw was a real prism through which tensions could be seen 
throughout the whole of Congress Poland. As afore-mentioned Polish-Jewish 
relations were deeply affected for the very first time in the 1907 State Duma 
Election by the scare of ‘Jewish domination’. Warsaw, with its Jewish community 
numbering over 200,000 thousand, was the most important centre of the Jewish 
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population in Europe42. But the public presence of the Jews began to irritate the 
‘Christian’ majority. 
By the decision of the Russian administration a requirement was made in 
the municipal electoral group to register candidates. Among the 83 electors of a 
deputy from Warsaw, there happened to be 46 Jews, which made 55 percent of all 
electors. When in mid-August the Tsarist government released information on 
eligible and registered voters, the news was a shock to Poles. For most of the 
Polish public, whether right or centre-left, the conclusion was to form a united 
front, including the Jews, to oppose any separate Jewish lists and insure the 
election of a Polish delegate. However, the National Democrats and first and 
foremost Dmowski himself rejected the idea that any sort of agreement with 
Jewish voters was possible on acceptable terms. The nationalist press then held 
that the only way to successfully combat ‘the Jewish threat’ was for all Poles to 
rally around National Democracy and then fiercely attack all opposition, claiming 
that all who opposed the Endeks, were taking their cues directly from the Jews.  
However at the very beginning this indolent campaign – nobody believed 
in the victory of the Endeks in Warsaw – was instigated by Dmowski himself. It 
seems that by forcefully putting himself up as a candidate in order to provoke all 
his foes (since the 1905 Revolution he was likely the most hated political 
personality amongst the Left and liberals), he counted on splitting Polish voices 
into ‘national’ and ‘Jewish’, which was typical of his binary, apocalyptic vision of 
the world and society. Jan Kucharzewski, the alternative candidate of the united 
camp of the opposition dubbed ‘Concentration’ (Koncentracja), his main 
opponent, stood no chances if he was deprived of Jewish votes. But Jewish 
electors, irritated by Kucharzewski’s attitude, voted in the end for an unknown 
candidate from the workers’ electoral group. 
In one of his speeches Dmowski claimed that a Polish delegate chosen with 
Jewish votes would represent Jewish, not Polish interests, and therefore by no 
means would be acceptable. Thus, over the last days of the campaign the Endeks’ 
propaganda machine was waging bitter polemical warfare with their Polish 
opponents, presenting the struggle with the Jews not only as the central issue, but 
as well as a moral battle and ultimately a ‘life and death question’. One of the 
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most frequently used weapons by the Endeks press was to tie their opponents with 
a ‘Jew-word’. The centre-right Concentration was therefore referred to as a 
‘Jewish Polish Concentration’, and its members as ‘Jewish hirelings’ or puppets. 
All others as either ‘defenders of the Jews’ or representatives of ‘Judeo-polonia’, 
‘Jewish flunkies’ or ‘Judaicized Poles’. As the liberal critic Józef Lange noted: 
‘nowadays everything in the country is Jewish, with the exception of National 
Democracy’43. 
At the peak of this campaign the party began to publish the yellow daily 
Morning Gazette Two Pennies (Gazeta Poranna 2 Grosze), soon a capital ship of 
the whole anti-Jewish campaign in Russian Poland, which proclaimed that ‘it 
accepted advertising only from Christians’, and ‘Workers! Don’t elect Jewish 
flunkeys!’ and then called for an anti-Jewish boycott, and in the end waged war 
against the Jews. In contrast to the vigorous hate campaign of the Endeks, all 
parties within Concentration, not mentioning the socialist Left lacked either real 
unity, charismatic leadership, or a consistent program.  
What was more than significant was that the Endeks’ aggressive agitation 
in the campaign was not especially directed against the Jews as such, but mainly 
against Dmowski’s Polish competitors, whom he blamed for being ‘Jewish 
puppets’. Both earlier and the most recent studies underline the limited influence 
of the economic boycott on the Jewish community44. One must therefore bear in 
mind that the conflict had a wider effect in a more profound sense. Indeed, the 
nationalist mobilization was directed not only against Jewish trade and industry, 
but denounced all contacts between Poles with Jews or with people considered to 
be ‘Jewish’. And in that sense, it was the most successful. 
The practical ‘fruit’ of the boycott campaign was the Society Rozwój 
(Development), the Society for the Development of Industry, Crafts and Trade 
(Towarzystwo Rozwóju Przemysłu), with its branches appearing in the whole area 
of the Russian partition. Rozwój ran its frenetic agitation in nationalist journals: 
the opinion-making Gazeta Warszawska, and the agitation spreading Gazeta 
Poranna 2 Grosze (the authors of which included the nationalist élite of the next 
for two upcoming decades: Stanisław Kozicki, Ignacy Oksza-Grabowski, 
Stanisław Pieńkowski, Władysław Jabłonowski, to name a few), but also in 
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periodicals addressed to individual social groups. This campaign was also 
conducted in the Catholic ecclesiastical press (e.g. Catholic Review [Przegląd 
Katolicki], Pole-Catholic [Polak-Katolik], and Sowing [Posiew]) and in some 
conservative-clerical dailies, such as Day (Dzień), Daily for Everyone (Dziennik 
dla Wszystkich), and the General Chronicle (Kronika Powszechna) appearing in 
Galicia. Rozwój also issued its own publications such as the Each to Your Own 
(Swój do swego) and the Boycott (Bojkot) in Lwów; it also took up some smaller 
initiatives, such as My Little Journal (Moje Pisemko), or Our World (Nasz Świat) 
– journals primarily addressed to children and youngsters. The anti-Jewish 
boycott campaign seems to be the Polish largest and most branched social 
movement of the time.   
Perhaps the most striking in this enormous campaign of hate was that in the 
provinces the election results did not differ much from the previous ones: in fact, 
they became but a pretext for the ND for their campaign against the Jews. The 
nationalist press had even earlier been full of boycott slogans. They frequently 
referred to Irish or Czech examples from the epoch, justifying the fight against 
‘Jewish expansiveness’ by the defense of ‘the state of Polish possessions’. But 
this kind of rationalization could not conceal the fact that the goals of the fight 
against the Jews were more far-reaching. Stanisław Pieńkowski vociferated in 
October: ‘The boycott, or a ruthless though bloodless Polish-Jewish war is the 
beginning of a new era for Poland’45. He declared that Jews stood behind every 
trend and tendency that seemed to threaten Poland’s existence – i.e., liberalism 
and progressivism, not to mention every kind of revolutionary movement. The 
publicist understood the prospects for a national revival of Polish society in 
militant anti-Semitism. What is really fascinating is that during the three years 
just before the Great War, the language of biological racism infiltrated and 
subverted Polish public culture, yet the tendency in the nationalist press 
(especially in Gazeta Poranna 2 Grosze) to think of Jews in racial and diabolic 
terms was more extreme, influencing even the centre-right press. Of course, there 
were distinctions between the cases. The further one went towards the political 
right the more virulent were the expressions of hatred.  
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Step by step, the nationalist rhetoric, which focused on the Jews, also 
became more aggressive. This kind of reasoning reduced ‘all the affairs of this 
world’ to the plotting and scheming of ‘international Jewry’ and then the free-
masons. Under the wing of this campaign flourished the most extreme forms of 
anti-Semitism, from virtually medieval accusations of ritual murder up to strictly 
racist divagations about the degenerating influence of the Jewish race on the Poles. 
A manifesto of this kind of thinking was contained in the publications of 
Dmowski, who on the eve of the World War argued that a Poland without Jews 
was possible only in a Europe without Jews. 
Though the boycott was started and instigated by the Endeks and then the 
Catholic press, it was supported by a large part of the progressive press, including 
the leading opinion-making titles of the time: namely the Truth (Prawda) and the 
Polish Humanist (Humanista Polski). In a less overt way, the same ideas were 
propagated by a number of opinion-making periodicals (such as Illustrated 
Weekly [Tygodnik Ilustrowany], or the conservative World [Świat], published by 
the Jewish converts, established Olgerbrand family, and even by the centre-right 
Warsaw Courier [Kurier Warszawski]). However, the conservative journals (the 
conciliatory Polish Courier [Kurier Polski] and Word [Słowo], connected with the 
Party of Real Politics) kept aloof from this campaign. The only big Warsaw daily 
that expressed condemnation of this anti-Semitic hullaballoo was the New Gazette 
(Nowa Gazeta). The independentist socialist journals, whose readers were 
actually few, were also against the anti-Semitic agitation. 
There were also certain personal protests, such as those by Adam 
Zakrzewski and Józef Lange, centre-left intellectuals who left the Polish 
Progressive Party. Much more significant were the public voices of condemnation 
of the anti-Semitic aggression and the boycott: apart from the Catholic journalist 
Teresa Lubińska and the leftist activist Stefania Sempołowska, worthy of note is 
also the attitude of Ludomir Grendyszyński, a conservative from Erazm Piltz’s 
political circle. Nothing, however, could be compared to the efforts of Jan 
Baudouin de Courtenay, who until the outbreak of the war was dogged in the 
fight against anti-Semitism46. 
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All segregationist slogans soon affected other ‘Jewish enterprises’. Gazeta 
Poranna as well as Gazeta Warszawska called for boycotting and social 
marginalizing all the representatives of the intelligentsia of Jewish descent. These 
dailies along with the opinion-making the National Review (Przegląd Narodowy) 
became strongholds of the ND’s vision of the world. Nationalist periodicals in the 
provinces, following in the footsteps of Gazeta Poranna, introduced special 
columns entitled ‘Jewish Masquerade’, which unmasked and then denounced the 
businesses whose owners or employees were of Jewish descent. The boycott also 
embraced the noted adversaries of anti-Semitic excesses, such as Ludwik 
Krzywicki, Ludwik Straszewicz or Jan Baudouin de Courtenay. 
The campaign initiated in autumn 1912 most painfully afflicted the Poles of 
Jewish descent. A dramatic duality could be noticed among the assimilated Polish 
Jews, and this was most manifest in the daily Nowa Gazeta, or the liberal weekly 
the Free Word (Wolne Słowo), whose authors, mostly connected with progressive 
democracy, found themselves at the cross-roads. The radicalization of anti-
Semitism polarized opinion even among the Poles of Jewish descent. 
While the journalists of Nowa Gazeta (among others, Stanisław Kempner, 
Józef Wasercug, and the aforementioned Józef Lange) strongly opposed the anti-
Jewish campaign, the majority of the progressive camp, including the most 
important grouping Polish Progressive Union and the Polish Progressive Party of 
Henryk Konic – supported the economic boycott of the Jews. Among the 
enthusiasts of this scaremongering were afore-mentioned Juljan Unszlicht and 
Leon Brunn, a former liberal politician. 
 
Résumé  
However, the most important side-effect of the anti-Semitic campaign of 
1912 was the firm embedding of anti-Semitism in the political culture of 
Congress Poland, and later on of all the Polish lands. The majority of endemic 
anti-Semitic initiatives in the Polish lands, various anti-Jewish sub-cultures such 
as Stojałowski’s movement in the Western Part of Galicia, the weekly Progress 
(Postęp) in Prussian Poland, or the movement of ‘land-tillers’ (rolarze) followers 
of Jan Jeleński movements in Congress Poland – these were taken under the wing 
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of National Democracy. Anti-Semitism in various forms became one of the 
permanent elements of the cultural code of the conservative part of Polish society, 
with the negative attitude toward the Jews being the basic indicator of their 
national identity.  
In this regard, more than any other political event of the time, the election 
and boycott campaign of 1912 marked a turning point in the further radicalization 
of the Polish right and of the implementation of various anti-Jewish discourses 
into public life. Furthermore, for the majority of Poles, the Jews as a community 
became a separate element, if not a hostile one, then at best a group who did not 
bother about ‘Polish interests’. 
But was it truly a vital question – or just a mental crutch? It was certainly 
still an era of post-revolutionary prostration, an undermining of belief in guiding 
ideas, an era of cultural pessimism, the years of Stołypin’s reaction, a time of 
police and, last but not least, of economic crisis. When the Tsarist government 
revealed a proposal to separate Chełm province from Congress Poland and to 
nationalize the Warsaw-Vienna railway line, feelings of Polish impotence and of 
the failure of the Polish cause were overwhelming under the all partitions. All the 
same, one should ask here whether such conflict could have been avoided at all? 
And yet in doing so, we need take into consideration the mentality of that era, the 
ideas of nation and national territory, of the rights of the majority to this territory, 
and the place reserved for national minorities and compare that situation with 
what we know of the experiences of other countries, at least from the region. 
Politically all these changes affected most strongly the progressivists and 
the Left. This was the real decline of the Polish version of liberalism. Nearly the 
whole new generation of Poles – i.e., those who entered the reborn Polish state in 
1918 – echoed this xenophobic image of the Jews. In fact then, anti-Semitism 
became an integral part of the modern Polish identity.  
As a matter of fact, the 1912 anti-Jewish boycott campaign was then a huge 
nationalist and anti-Semitic mobilization in all Polish territories. Yet without 
further research it is difficult to define to what extent these ‘anti-Semitic sporting 
events’ (as the Polish writer Zofia Nałkowska dubbed them, or ‘furor polonicus’ 
by the Jewish historian Shimon Dubnov) had taken root in the provinces.  
27 
Another, no less important phenomenon that affected Polish-Jewish 
relations was the powerful revival and the rise of the Jewish community in the 
Polish lands. It was then that the Jews as a community wanted to appear as a 
legitimate society. This was a fact of enormous importance for the further Polish-
Jewish debate. Icchok Perec (Itskhok Perets), the writer, stated at a meeting in 
1907: ‘The Jews want to be themselves’. The Jewish population en masse no 
longer wanted to communicate with the Poles with the help of middle-men, i.e., 
Poles of Jewish descent. Although this process did not elsewhere reach the same 
dynamic as in Congress Poland, in fact it could not be stopped. The period of 
Polish mono-culture, sustained by both sides, was no longer possible. The 
majority of the Polish political class did not want to recognize this fact – and this 
mono-cultural attitude among Polish elites had many names. For the National 
Democracy it meant the exclusion of all the ‘non-Polish’ groups from the national 
community, up to the wish to turn the fight against ‘the Jewish threat’, ‘the enemy 
within’ into the pivot of its entire ideological project. For other groups, also those 
referring to the tradition of the Enlightenment, it signified the factual hegemony 
of Polish culture and the absolute loyalty of the minorities. 
Though this anti-Semitic mobilization in Polish lands turned out to be a 
crucial and telling episode in the annals of modern anti-Semitism in the region, it 
was for a long time completely neglected by Polish historiography and hardly 
known to others historians. The Polish lands in that period spawned a horrid 
upsurge of anti-Semitism and various other forms of xenophobia that seemed on 
the one hand a wave of archaic fantasies on the other pure ethnic and racial hatred. 
Popular anti-Semitism also played a role in it. In that sense, the blitz campaign of 
1912 and the chauvinist mobilization against the Jews afterwards had more in 
common with what was to come: a fusion of old anti-Jewish prejudices, an 
elaborate paranoid ideology, and deluded raison d’état arguments. 
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Children of Modernism: 
Some Remarks on Jewish Youth Political Culture  




The goal of this article is to present some insights and ideas on the political 
culture of the Jewish youth in interwar Poland. It is based on the new reading of 
the YIVO autobiographies of the Jewish youth. They will be analyzed as personal 
documents deeply rooted in the culture of radical political modernism of interwar 
period.1 By new reading of the YIVO autobiographies, I will identify a few of 
crucial features of political culture, socialization and consciousness of the Jewish 
youth. In the second part of the text I will briefly refer to another group of sources 
related to the anti-Jewish violence in interwar Poland, which became important 
context of political socialization of the Jewish youth and exerted important 
influence on its political culture. What follows investigates fascinating problems 
of relation between patterns of socialization and cultural experience of interwar 
Jewish youth, its acculturation, as one of the main features of its experience, and 
finally, symbolic and physical violence that it was subjected to. I claim that 
violence not only affected “the material”, “physical” and “external” conditions of 
Jewish life but also became an internal element of interwar political Jewish 
culture.  
 
Political modernism, crisis of tradition and political radicalization 
Political modernism, in its radical interwar form, was filled out with 
feelings of insecurity, crisis, decay and collapse of the contemporary world. 
Tomorrow had become today, political modernism, in its radical left or radical 
right forms looked for and acted for the “new beginning”, for far reaching, 
revolutionary in its character change of the contemporary world. These ideas were 
accompanied by a specific form of chiliasm or millenarism, convictions of 
inevitability of great cataclysm, revolutionary struggle, violent fight as 
preconditions of the coming of a new world and a new man. As such, modernist 
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political movements promoted uncompromised filiarchy, superiority of the 
younger generations above the older ones, representing decay of the 
contemporary world. Modernist filiarchy assumed a special role of “the youth” in 
necessary radical political and social action. Finally, a future modernist salvation 
was not possible without the struggle, hence not without ideological, cultural and 
also to some degree of physical violence.2 
Young Jewish participants of the YIVO autobiographical contest organized 
in the years 1932, 1934 and 1939 were asked to write about the totality of their 
life, parents, primary surroundings, friends, school, work, their life plans and 
dreams. Politics, their potential activities in youth movements and political 
organizations, were only one of many aspects of their life that they were asked to 
touch upon in their autobiographies.3 Nevertheless, supposedly the “non-political” 
parts of young people writings should be of the most interest precisely to 
historians of Jewish politics and youth’s political consciousness. One of the most 
striking features of the descriptions of the primary surrounding, family, social and 
cultural space of shtetl, or Jewish neighborhoods of the larger city, provided by 
the YIVO contest participants, is their outmost modernist character. Decisive 
majority of the autobiographies describe their primary social space as marked by 
deep crisis, decay, anomy of traditional social norms, economical and gender 
roles, most often epitomized by the generation of their parents. Descriptions of 
the family life provided coherence between the descriptions of wider social space, 
both marked by modernist socio-political imagination. Here is one of many 
illustrative examples provided by a son of poor Yiddish speaking artisan family, 
growing up in Central Poland:   
 
The Town where I was born was small (…) Here is the exchange and here 
are the Jews, with their heavy beards and cloth coats. Their hats sit on their 
heads like lids, once black, now faded to a reddish brown by the sun. They 
stroll with pieces of straw in their mouths, waiting, as always, for the car 
from the big city. And here it comes, honking from the distance to 
announce its arrival. The Jews quickly swarm about it, like flies around a 
lump of sugar on a hot summer day.4 
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“Greyno”, author of this quotation, while writing his autobiography was a 
devoted activist of illegal Polish Communist Party. But we can find very similar 
quotations describing older generations of parents and grandparents that have 
exactly the same, radical socio-political meaning in tens of autobiographies of 
different authors whose views were very remote from communism. Here is 
another example:  
 
My parents. Father: Physically weak. Extremely religious, real fanatic (…) 
he was characterized by the cowardly worship for Jewish religious sages, 
holy stories, of every holy paragraph [frumenpsuk] wherever it was written   
(…) coward. Not cheerful, asocial, always complaining. Had no empathy 
for other people and their feelings. He was not interested in politics. That is 
why he was solely interested in his business, in financial issues, leaving all 
the family matters to his wife and children.5 
We can find a very similar critique of the older generations, their narrow 
intellectual, cultural and political horizons, their preoccupation with mundane 
matters even in the autobiography of young teacher working in orthodox Beis 
Yankev school for Jewish girls:  
All of this would have been bearable were it not for the interference of the 
parents. They expected their children to learn everything in one month (…) 
almost all the parents had the same complaint (…) It was simply the 
custom to complain. Apparently this was a way of passing the time (…) it 
hurt that these people were so limited (…) The children themselves were 
truly pleased and came to school eagerly. The parents were at fault for 
measuring everything according to its usefulness to them. Here, too, as 
with everything else in their little world, they wanted to “get the most for 
their money”.6 
Interwar Polish Jewish society was characterized by a deep generational 
conflict. It was only deepened by the unprecedented politicization of the youngest 
generation who, contrary to their most often conservative, traditional parents, 
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were adherents of modernist political movements advocating one of many 
different modernist programs of radical transformation of the surrounding reality. 
As it was summed up by “Gamalielis”, scion of relatively rich, religious family, 
aspiring to local orthodox elite, who himself chose very different path and 
became active member of secularist, revolutionary political party Poalei Zion 
Left: 
The young generation grows, and it is hard to characterize, lost in its 
longings, it is embittered. From what its embittered? It is hard to see!! Its 
social center is not any more the Beit Midrash or Kloiz, they belong to 
fathers and grandfathers, leaders of the society. Party and political fight, 
jealousy and hate rule in the midst of youth”7.  
Jewish youth in interwar Poland doubtlessly also shared filiarchy of the 
interwar modernism. It saw itself and it was seen by the older elites of Zionist and 
their socialist doikeyt (Yiddish, means “hereness”) oriented rivals, by the new 
Jewish school systems, and finally by YIVO itself, as an only hope to bring the 
awaited, revolutionary “new” against decayed, present “old”. This modernism of 
thought was matched by new reality and indeed new and different socialization 
patterns of the young Jews in interwar Poland. This was the first generation that 
went to universal system of primary schooling, state or Jewish private one. This 
was the generation raised to have higher professional and private ambitions than 
their parents – unattainable in the country shaken by internal and external strife. 
Finally, this was the generation raised in the “democratic promise” of the Polish II 
Republic, of equality of all of its citizens, generation that experienced its 
upbringing and adulthood as a break of this promise. Rhetoric and physical anti-
Semitism, professional and educational discrimination – all this made Max 
Weinreich rightful to describe the young generation of Polish Jews as facing 
“double discrimination” – on the one level as most of the young people in Poland 
facing lack of life perspectives and possibilities to attain their ambitions, on the 
second level, facing discrimination as Jews.8 In this situation it is not surprising 
that young people so enthusiastically responded to the call of these political 
parties and youth movements that propagated one of many modernist versions of 
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radical transformation of Jewish and general social reality. It is important to note 
that the role of these institutions in the lives of young people widely transgressed 
narrowly defined “politics”. Youth movements, among many other roles, were 
important educational institutions – their ideologies strongly affected the way in 
which young people looked upon the reality surrounding them. For many of them 
the ideologies were superior forms of social knowledge. All of this produced a 
phenomenon which after Pierre Bourdieu I call “radical habitus”: deeply 
internalized disposition of young people to think about and act upon their social 
and political surrounding on the basis of modernist categories of radical change.9 
This “radical habitus” transgressed deep political fragmentarization of 
interwar Jewish society and superseded its ideological divisions. Again, we can 
find a proof of this phenomenon in most of the YIVO autobiographies. Let us 
look upon young Halutz, member of kibbutz in Grochów near Warsaw. In the 
final part of his work, where he was asked to share his life plans and dreams, he 
wrote instead:    
 
I was born in the time of an eruption of a volcano. The question of today is, 
if one can hide from its lava? There is only one answer: to fight for 
different tomorrow. The moment of uprising of millions of workers is 
inevitable. They will start to act, they will shed their hot lava on cities and 
villages, and will build the new world based on the rules of socialism.10 
 
Catastrophism expressed by this young Halutz attending hahshara in 
famous Grochów kibbutz characterized most of his peers taking part in the YIVO 
contest and was one of central markers of their radically modernist political 
imagination. As it was written by “Kola” in summer 1939, for the last of the 
YIVO autobiographical contests:  
 
Struggle is everywhere and black clouds are approaching, shading the sun. 
If we, working masses, will not stand up, will not join our strength of the 
international proletariat, will not shed from our backs the bloodsuckers, for 
my generation there will be nothing but grey road of even bigger hunger 
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and suffering. We are full of lofty thoughts. Our eyes are dim, but our 
hearts are trembling, they are ready to burn any time, to become our torch 
in the final struggle.11 
 
What was characteristic for this generation was its modernist radicalism 
that made its young representatives often to cross narrow ideological boundaries 
of their parties and movements. Young radicals, on the level of political 
consciousness – described above as “radical habitus” – were much more similar 
than different. One example can be provided by the visions of the new men of the 
future, so prominently present in the autobiographies. Young communists many 
times declared their admiration for new Jewish men being born in Palestine, 
young right-wing members of Zionist Beitar were dragged by the appeal of the 
Red Flag and collective strength of proletariat marching under it, as it was in the 
case of “Hanzi”:  
 
Quite unexpectedly, I experienced an ideological crisis. On one hand, I felt 
a sense of national pride, while on the other hand I felt enormous sympathy 
for the world proletariat and for Russia and its revolution. I had great 
respect for those who marched on the May Day, holding the red flag of the 
workers. I wanted to be like them and add my voice to the song of their 
uprising.12 
 
Despite all of the party and ideological conflict, the “radical habitus” of the 
Jewish youth made its very different representatives to think and act in very 
similar categories. This, together with frequent social closeness of members of 
various conflicted movements, divisions between Poalei Zion Left Yugend and 
Ha Noar ha Ivri, between Bund “Tzukunft” and Dror, between Communist and 
Jewish nationalist, sometimes ran between siblings, friends from heder, in 
playgrounds of shtetls and Jewish neighborhoods. This modernist ideological 
similarity and social proximity made young people to constantly change their 
political affiliations. Out of 100 YIVO autobiographies that I have examined, 
more than half of their authors changed their political allegiance at least once, 
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sometimes drastically, like moving from Beitar to Communist Union of the Youth, 
or back. This situation was aptly exemplified by “Beniamin R.”, left-wing Zionist 
and active member of Right Poalei Zion, one of the authors characterized by the 
highest political awareness and proficiency in ideological nuances of interwar 
Jewish politics. In his autobiography he had described case of his shtetl peer, a 
friend from heder and at the same time, a political folly:  
 
This was the time when people from various sides of political spectrum 
had stormed into the He Halutz. Winter 1933 “Tzukunft” was disbanded 
and its members went to He Halutz or to “the Reds”. One of “the Reds” 
already managed to become Halutz. It was my old acquaintance Shmulik 
Bergman. After he finished his studies in local heder he became a barber 
and a member of Freiheit. He spent here some time and then joined the 
Bund. In Bund he did not sat for a long time and became the member of the 
Communist Party. He would stay there if not his terrible economical 
situation. He did not have any other option but to emigrate. Because of this, 
he was even ready to join the Beitar… At the end some people had pity 
over him and took them into He Halutz.13 
 
Common “radical habitus” of the youth can be seen also in the visions of 
future and directions of the social change. Radicalism was common denominator 
of all of such visions. Some of the authors concentrated on the mission of creating 
the new Jewish man in Palestine. According to them it was the only possibility 
and only positive program available to the Jews. Others believed in revolution 
taking place “here”, in Poland and Europe. For most of the authors, in opposition 
to the ideologues of their mother movements, these were not self-excluding, but 
complementary visions. Almost all of the authors shared imperative of radical, or 
even revolutionary transformation of the society. They argued about the place that 
should be taken in it by the Jews. But most of the participants of the YIVO 
contest agreed that it was unavoidable and necessary.    
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Young Jews, Polish State, the rise of popular anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish 
violence 
Another fascinating and important context of the Jewish experience of the 
II Polish Republic was acculturation of the youth. Here I will discuss it with its 
relation to another central feature of the political modernism, its appraisal of 
power, strength and connection to rhetorical and physical violence. In 1930s 80% 
of young Jews studied in Polish state schools. Private Jewish schools also 
followed state curriculum and taught Polish culture and with that, symbols of 
Polish nationalism in the classes of Polish history, geography, literature or so-
called “state lessons”. Almost all young Jews were subjected to the influence of 
Polish language through the participation in the modern mass culture, much more 
universal than it was in the case of former generations socialized in very different 
conditions of Czarist Russia or the Habsburg Empire. An important outcome of 
this process was what I call “symbolic acculturation”: deep internalization of 
Polish cultural and specifically nationalist symbols that went hand in hand with 
fervent, modern Jewish nationalism. 14  “Ester”, describing herself as ‘proud 
Chassidic daughter’, in the moment of writing her autobiography she was 
teaching in Beis Yankev orthodox school system for Jewish girls that fought with 
language Polonization of its pupils. She recalled her childhood (she wrote her 
autobiography in Yiddish) during which the Polish acculturation was an 
important element of her own growing up experience:  
 
I was reading historical novels of Sienkiewicz, Prus, Orzeszkowa and 
others (…) Polish books gave me much to think about. I saw life from a 
different perspective. For the first time I saw another kind of existence. I 
learned about the extraordinary heroism of historical figures (…) I was 
then in the seventh grade of public school. I kept diary in Polish. I was 
becoming more and more immersed in the Polish language. I especially 
loved Polish literature. I idolized Polish Romantic poets: Mickiewicz and 
Słowacki. Polish history was a subject that I loved and learned easily. I was 
enthralled by everything connected with Polish history. I was consumed 
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with the great martyrdom of Polish heroes in their struggle for Poland’s 
independence. I venerated Marshal Józef Piłsudski.15 
 
The strongest example of the interesting cultural identity processes taking 
place among the Jewish youth is provided by the autobiography of “Etonis”. His 
case is quite an exceptional one. He belonged to the Lithuanian Jewry, before 
1918 practically not exposed to the influences of Polish culture. As the son of an 
orthodox elite, he belonged to minority of authors who studied only in private 
Jewish orthodox institutions (traditional heder, hedermetukan and various 
yeshivot in the end), never went to a Polish state school. Despite all of this he 
ended his autobiography with the following characteristic fragment:  
 
Finally, after much consideration and introspection, I did not return to the 
yeshiva in the winter of 1931-1932. I stayed in our town, where I found 
position in teaching Jewish religion in the public school. I began to study 
secular subjects on my own. (…) Still, I wanted to complete the entire course 
of the studies in a gymnasium (…) I decided to move to a city. And so this 
past summer I came to Vilna, where I prepared myself for the eight form of 
gymnasium, working hard all summer. Of all of my studies, I most enjoyed 
the poetry of Mickiewicz, which often stirred my own suffering soul.”16 
 
Ardent activist of the Zionist “Gordonia”, living in the fully Jewish milieu, 
in her diary (attached to the autobiography) describing dull daily life defined by 
boring and hard work, found Juliusz Słowacki’s poem as the most suitable for 
describing her sorrow: “Słowacki said the truth in his lament ‘Father of the 
poverty stricken’. When one’s heart is full of sorrow, when he feels the pain, it 
seems that the sun is not the sun, and the word is different, ugly, stupid and cruel. 
Yes, I feel the same way.”17 Another author, follower of Beitar had filled large 
parts of his autobiography with reflections on the crisis of European culture. 
Modernist program of its renewal was, according to him, symbolized by the 
famous call of Mickiewicz: “Together, young friends!”18. Different author, from 
Galicia, described her childhood games with friends:  
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I am anxiously following Fryda’s slow steps. How strange it is! Even when 
they are playing they quarrel over who will get more. Get more towns! Our 
mistress told us yesterday how the Poles had fought against their enemies, 
how the foes had divided Poland into three parts. Each took one part 
…(The Poles) gathered at night and adopted the Constitution of May 3rd. 
The Constitution had laws which were very good for the Poles. This is why 
we rejoice. We will go to the synagogue. There will be a service there. But 
remember, be good. There will also be other schools from the town in the 
synagogue. Don’t make me feel ashamed.19 
 
This universal, although having very different scope and different 
dynamics in different Jewish milieus, process of Polish acculturation could 
connect youth to the state and integrate it with the dominant nation. In fact, 
situation was quite contrary. Growing acculturation of the Jewish youth had only 
deepened its social and political frustration, experience of discrimination and of 
exclusion. This was caused by another universal experience of the Jewish youth, 
anti-Semitism. Most often first social space in which they had consciously 
experience it was a Polish state school where young Jews confronted non-Jewish 
environment for the first time in their lives. One of the paradoxes of the era is the 
fact that school, which was to integrate national minorities and Jews among them, 
was the place where anti-Semitism was experienced most often. Anti-Jewish, 
traditional and modern racial stances were presented both by many non-Jewish 
pupils and teachers. Anti-Semitic experience was most vulnerably felt by the 
Jewish children aspiring to higher social positions and active adult life in a non-
Jewish society, by the students of high schools and universities. These were the 
people characterized by the higher than average level of Polish acculturation, with 
the strongest belief in the promise of democratic Poland, and with the experience 
of breaking of this promise, feeling very strong resentment towards state 
institutions that allowed or sometimes even professed discrimination. In this 
context, the most important phenomenon of the Jewish growing up experience in 
the era of Polish II Republic is the fact that this specific experience, known to the 
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narrow Jewish elites already from the second half of XIX century, through XX 
century modernization, especially, through universal state education, became 
somehow universal. Now symbolic acculturation, and through it, stronger feeling 
of exclusion and resentment caused by anti-Semitism became a formative life 
experience for decisive majority of Jewish children, coming from traditional 
backgrounds previously not exposed to the Polish culture. One of the authors 
from Galicia wrote:  
 
The biggest obstacle to find work was my religion. (…) I went to the director 
of the society that was running my trade school, who liked me very much. 
He was also major of Złoczów (…) He said to me, “I could help you, if you 
were not Jewish”. It pained me a lot. Is this my fault to be born as a Jewish 
girl? Did somebody ask me for opinion, who were to be my parents, or who I 
would like to be? I was the best student in the school, my Polish papers were 
read in front of the whole class as an example of an excellent writing. How 
many devotion, love to the country in which I was born and I grew up was in 
those papers.20 
 
Boy from traditional religious home recalled his school experience:  
 
One teacher (…) sticks in my memory. He caused me a great deal of trouble 
and used to make fun of my peyes and my long coat. He taught history and 
Polish. Today, he is the leader of the Endek Party in our area and is known to 
be very anti-Semitic. I was very fond of the director of the school, Mr. 
Kowalski, who in his time had gained a reputation as a great humanist. I had 
wonderful conversations with him (in the seventh grade) about the Bible and 
Talmud, which pleased him quite a bit. On the whole, I remember him a very 
refined person with great pedagogical abilities. However, he, too, has now 
moved over to the anti-Semitic camp, although he still holds the same 
post.”21 
 
Similiar was experience of “Yesh”:  
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Primary school [Szkoła Powszechna] where I went was a Polish school. 
Our teacher was extreme anti-Semite, she did not covered it at all. Despite 
that Jewish girls were majority in the class and were much more capable, 
she referred to us unpleasantly. She harassed us at any occasion. We were 
still too young to react in a proper way. Only our reaction was inner wrath 
and hidden hatred.22 
 
One of the most drastic descriptions of school anti-Semitism and violence 
that followed, were provided by Jewish student of Polish primary school from 
Lwów:  
 
New anti-Semitic teachers have arrived. Their greatest joy was to torment 
Jewish pupils (…) During intervals between the lessons I was just looking 
for a hidden corner where I could hide from fists of catholic pupils. When 
classes were finally over, usually beside the school gates we were awaited by 
few plucky “shaigetzim” who would beat us with their fists, armed in 
wooden knuckle-busters. I would return from school beaten up, full of 
bruises, without any will to study and to live (…) School directors were 
mute to our complains, it seems that they were even satisfied with what was 
happening. When I had to get up in the morning, I would cry dressing up for 
school, knowing that I will go there to be tormented by pupils and teachers.23 
 
The anti-Semitic experience, paradoxically in large extent through Polish 
state school system, became “democratic” and universal, filled collective 
biography of the whole interwar Jewish generation. Schools, institutions of the 
state that declared itself as realization of democratic promises and universal 
equality, with its exclusive cultural model and even more with presence of anti-
Jewish hatred, created much higher emancipatory aspirations that it was the case 
with older Jewish generations, and simultaneously, serving as a proof for this 
broken promise, created feeling of resentment towards the state. One of the most 
important features of the autobiographies, which has very deep and important 
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political meaning, is fact that youth almost universally felt that their right as 
Jewish individuals, and their collective national rights, were broken in interwar 
Polish reality. This feeling of resentment, discrimination and high emancipatory 
ambitions, together with mentioned previously radically modernist socio-political 
imagination, are the most important meta-political feature of youth consciousness, 
which had very important political meaning. In her important study of differences 
in response towards the modern anti-Semitism of German and Eastern Jewries 
before 1914 Shulamit Volkov had drawn a deep line dividing both of them. 
Acculturated German Jewry was to experience anti-Semitism in much more 
psychologically harmful way, “internally”, as threatening very foundations of 
their identity. Eastern Jewry may have been much more harmed physically, but its 
cultural separation, ethnic distinctiveness and finally newly developed modern 
nationalism protected it from this “internal psychological experience of anti-
Semitism”.24 My point is that, with all the differences between Jewish “East” and 
“West” in interwar period, Volkov division does not hold. I would like to quote 
one characteristic fragment from YIVO autobiographies:  
 
In public school we were told to love Poland, we were taught to live and 
die for it. Something like a feeling of jealousy was awakened in me. Why 
we, Jews, cannot have our own country? (…) A thought about Palestine 
was not awakened in me by scholarly dissertations, books or propaganda, 
oh no! It was created as the reaction for the love for Poland that we were 
thought in the public school.25 
 
Polish culture was becoming important “mirror” through which young 
Jews looked at themselves and situation of Jewish nationalism. It played an 
unexpected role affecting how they had experienced anti-Semitic rhetoric and 
anti-Jewish violence that intensified in the last decade of interwar Poland. 
Symbolic acculturation made them much more offended by various anti-Semitic 




Political modernism and violence 
Experience of anti-Semitism and humiliation, combined with modernism 
socio-political consciousness and “radical habitus”, called for response, for 
counter violence and through manifestation of Jewish strength for denial of the 
anti-Semitic stereotypes. Jewish counter-violence which was less self-defense and 
more symbolic denial of anti-Jewish stereotypes was present in the Bund Ordener 
Grupe and Tzukunft-Sturem activities in Warsaw or even in He Halutz activities 
in the Grochów or in Kowel kibbutzim.26 Jewish nationalist party leaders from all 
sides were universally denouncing ongoing acculturation of the youth. One of its 
many vices was supposed to weaken Jewish pride, and consequently, response to 
anti-Semitism. This topic still awaits its extensive research but a glance on the 
anti-Semitic occurrences on the Polish universities, so often in 1930s, leads us to 
observation that Jewish students, in average most acculturated group among the 
Jewish youth, were most consistent group physically answering to the anti-
Semitic attackers.27 
As a manifestation of the very same process, different generational patterns 
of behavior represented by Jewish inhabitants of small town Przytyk – which on 
9th of March 1936 became the scene of one of the most famous anti-Jewish 
occurrences in interwar Poland – can be interpreted. Activists of Jewish self-
defense came from very different political groups: revisionists, left-wing Zionist, 
Mizrachist (and finally former or active communist). It is the “generational” and 
not the “party” key that allows us to understand Jewish stances in Przytyk. Jewish 
self-defense in Przytyk was organized in November 1935 by young people 
against the strategy and even knowledge of the older elites. The former ones were 
petitioning authorities and police on their futility or sheer lack of will to react 
toward anti-Jewish violence, youth prepared for a fight for a “Jewish honor”.28 
At the same time, Jewish youth was engaged in political violence not only 
towards its anti-Semitic foes. The 1930s were the scene of sometimes dramatic 
internal clashes between representatives of various Jewish political movements. 
One of the YIVO contest participants, and his account was not exceptional, wrote 
in his autobiography about his activity as Poalei Zion Right activist breaking any 
gathering of Revisionist in his own shtetl:  
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Yesterday, there was a revisionist gathering (…) I’ve heard already a few 
revisionist speeches, but I have never listened to such lies, such demagogy. 
But what made me furious even more is the fact that I was not bold enough 
to break it. It was a small room, Halutzim were few and they had not 
decided to interrupt the speech. Then, I’ve made a decision. From this day 
on I will go to revisionist speeches and I will break them! My personal 
honor demands that!  (…) In our shtetl we talk more about breaking of 
party meetings than on meetings itself. Each of them became something 
like a football game, each interruption was like a goal we scored.29 
 
Of course, the spirit of confrontation with ideological foes was often 
encouraged by the older generation. One of the most known cases of this is 1932 
Vladimir Jabotinsky call “Yo Brechn” that caused clashes between Right and Left 
wing Zionist not only in Palestine but also in Diaspora. In October 1934 the card 
carrying members Revisionists and Labor Zionist were surprised by sudden 
“peace” concluded by their leaders. Many were in shock, as the author of the 
above mentioned quote who attacked Revisionist after the “peace” was signed. 
Condemnations of cowardice of the older elites, not readiness of fight and 
sacrifice, Fabian tactics of not meeting modernist ideals of struggle, we find in 
many YIVO autobiographies as well as in the other sources. For example, 
political police reports on the activities of the Jewish parties in Kielce 
voievodship from April 1935 have noted League for Working Palestine gathering 
in Kielce where 200 Left Wing Zionists condemned Ben-Gurion-Jabotinsky 
agreement.30 The very same agreement was harshly condemned by one of the 
YIVO contest participants, Mendel Man (future famous Yiddish writer). With his 
own party, Poalei Zion Left in his native town of Płońsk (home town of David 
Ben-Gurion), he had organized mass meeting which condemned “left wing 
schemers” (that is Ben-Gurion, Mapai and Poalei Zion Right parties), “feeding on 
lack of consciousness of Jewish masses”, which called people to fight revisionist 
in the past, and now they entered secret talks with them. Mendel Man was staunch 
supporter of the uncompromised fight with the “Jewish fascist” (as revisionist 
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were called by their left wing foes).31  Mendel Man’s and many other YIVO 
autobiographies testify to the central characteristic of Jewish youth political 
culture in the 1930s. This was its ideological fervor, if not fanatism, that came 
together with constant and deep political conflict, rhetorical and sometimes also 
physical violence. Some of this eagerness to fight, to show one’s individual and 
collective strength stemmed from internalization of image of the Jewish weakness. 
Also, as all modernist violence, it was a kind of symbolic compensation of 
inability to fulfill modernist ambitions of radical transformation of the reality. 
There is no doubt that these features of Jewish youth political culture of the 
1930s stood behind the raising popularity of radical left (Bund, communists) or 
radical right. The latter was represented by revisionist youth movement “Beitar”. 
It had stood for organic unity of Jewish nation, hierarchy and obedience. Central 
value of the movement was physical strength, military proves and self-defense. 
Many of these elements of “Beitar” ideology were taken from the arsenal of 
Polish national movement.32 In the situation of an ongoing universal process of 
Polish acculturation affecting Jewish youth, this characteristic of “Beitar” was  
another advantage and reason of its raising popularity. All of this can be plainly 
seen in description of Vladimir Jabotinsky provided by “Chwila”, Polish language 
Zionist daily printed in Lwów.  
 
Person and personality of Vladimir Jabotinsky became a symbol of bravery, 
energy and sacrifice (…) Vladimir Jabotinsky is the man of fight. He is a 
natural born soldier, in every centimeter of his body and in his every breath 
(…) His straightforward thought cuts like sharp damask steel, is guided by 
fair heart and is aimed against every weakness, compromise and trumpery33 
 
As it was written by Jabotinsky himself, goal of the revisionist youth 
movement was:  
 
To form Beitar as a worldwide organism, which on the sign given from 
the center will be able to perform the same deed at the very same time by 
its ten thousands arms, the same deed in every country and in every city 
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(…) Because that is the most important achievement of the masses of free 
men, when they are capable of acting together with cruel accuracy of the 
machine34 
 
Modernist “radical habitus”, with its manifestation of power and 
readiness for struggle as its central feature from one side made ideological 
opponents so close to one another, but from the other, deepened the internal 
Jewish conflict as well. And many Jewish politicians of the time were aware of 
this malaise of political modernism that diminished the space for compromise, for 
pragmatic, cautious activity on behalf of whole Jewish community whose all 
members were threatened in the dire situation of the 1930s. But they themselves 
were caught in the ambivalence of the political culture of the time, they 
themselves participated in it and encouraged modernist radicalism of the young, 
and then faced its unwelcome consequences. Tragedy of modernism is another 
dimension of the Jewish tragedy in the 1930s Central-Eastern Europe and it still 
awaits to be thoroughly studied.   
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Anti-Semitism in France during the Late 19th Century: 




My specialism is modern French literature. At present, I am researching 
the role of journalism in the diffusion of anti-Semitism in France during the late 
nineteenth century. I am not an expert on Poland, but I would like to contribute to 
this workshop by commenting on French anti-Semitism. Regarding the insightful 
lecture just given by Professor Krzywiec, I was most interested in the fact that, in 
Poland after 1905, anti-Semites and Jewish communities both placed high value 
on journalistic activities. Journalism played a major role in the outbreak of anti-
Semitism in France. In that sense, France at the end of the nineteenth century can 
be regarded as a precedent for interwar Poland. I would argue that if we are to 
consider the relationship between anti-Semitism and journalism, then France at 
the end of the nineteenth century is worthy of our attention. In my report, “Anti-
Semitism in France during the Late 19th Century”, I have chosen to approach the 
characteristics of anti-Semitism in modern France by focusing on a certain 
individual. That person is the journalist Édouard Drumont also known as “The 
Pope of anti-Semitism.” By talking about the characteristics of French anti-
Semitism, and by focusing on the person Drumont, a person mentioned several 
times in Chauvinism, Polish Style: The case of Roman Dmowski by Professor 
Krzywiec, I hope to present another aspect of the European anti-Semitism.  
The French historian Léon Poliakov, in the renowned The History of Anti-
Semitism, defined the end of the nineteenth century France as the era in which 
“the most amount of ink was used up on the Jewish question.” To attack on Jews 
using “ink” rather than direct violence – “anti-Semitism of words” – was the 
nature of French anti-Semitism. The “anti-Semitism of words” eventually caused 
the Dreyfus affair (1894-1906), one of the most infamous cases of anti-Semitism 
in European history. In those days, a huge number of anti-Semitic statements 
concerning Alfred Dreyfus were disseminated.  
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The growth of anti-Semitism in France in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century originates from the publication of one book. In April of 1886, the 
relatively unknown journalist Drumont published La France juive – “Jewish 
France” in English – which not only became a massive bestseller but was also 
translated shortly thereafter, finding success throughout Europe. In his book, 
which was released in Italian, Spanish, German and Polish, as well as in French, 
Drumont clearly painted the Jewish people as the enemy of those concerned about 
the direction of modern society. Jews were labeled as foreigners and characterized 
as Semites.  
Against a backdrop in which Jewish people in the French Third Republic, 
where society had become more and more mobile as a result of modernization, 
were regularly made scapegoats, the “science” of the period that was authorized 
by academics was of crucial importance. In France, historian Jules Michelet and 
philologist Ernest Renan, who were considered academic authorities, created in 
their respective research fields a story of France as the pinnacle of civilization. 
Under the pretext of a “civilizing mission,” a policy of colonialism towards 
African and Asian nations came to be promoted. As a result of their work, the 
term “Shem” – the name of one of Noah’s three sons – came to refer to Jews in 
the nineteenth century France. The name Semite comes from Shem. Of course, 
this was a gross misuse. Within the binary opposition that resulted, the term 
“Aryan” was assigned positive values, while negative values were ascribed to the 
term “Semite.” Anti-Jewish sentiments had existed in Europe for a long time, and 
here they were reborn as anti-Semitism. Religious discrimination had gradually 
changed into a racial anti-Semitism. In France, this new type of anti-Semitism 
based on race theory was vulgarized by Drumont and thereby found its way to the 
masses. 
France had been the first country in Europe to grant citizenship to Jewish 
people. By the late eighteenth century, French Jews who gained citizenship 
through the French Revolution, in order to be good citizens of the Republic, were 
well-known to have promoted an assimilation policy in which it was understood 
that there were no contradictions between performing one's duties as a French 
citizen and practicing Judaism. In this process of assimilation, known as “le 
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franco-judaïsme,” French Jews used French rather than Hebrew in the synagogue, 
and praised France as the “New Jerusalem.” By the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, many French Jews had developed a strong sense of belonging to the 
French Republic rather than the Jewish community. They did not call themselves 
“Juif” – Jew in English – but instead preferred the term “Israelites,” which had 
less of a religious tone. Three generations after Jewish emancipation, the 
“Israelites” who had risen up through the social classes – Alfred Dreyfus being 
just such a person – came to be beset by anti-Semitism. 
Incidentally, many researchers refer to France at the end of the nineteenth 
century as the “golden age of the press.” It cannot be ignored that it was in this 
context that sales of Drumont’s La France juive exploded. Several factors had led 
to this “golden age.” On the 29th of July in 1881, the “Law on the Freedom of the 
Press,” which was to become one of the Third Republic’s most important laws, 
was enacted. The law guaranteed full freedom for the establishment of media, 
preventing the government from performing any censorship, admonitions, or 
punitive measures in relation to publication. Additionally, elements such as the 
innovation of printing technology, improved levels of literacy thanks to 
educational reform, and the development of railway networks led to an 
unprecedented boom in the publishing world in France. 
With the great success of La France juive, Drumont became a celebrity in 
the publishing world, and in April of 1892, he launched a daily newspaper, La 
Libre Parole – “The Free Word” in English. La Libre Parole, the first anti-
Semitic newspaper in France, would associate every issue with the Jews and 
repeat slanderous reports against Jews. “France for the French,” the slogan of La 
Libre Parole, has currently been taken up by the National Front, by the way. No 
matter how unfounded and absurd the newspaper’s allegations were, freedom of 
the press was guaranteed by law. Drumont’s journal was catapulted into fame 
about two years after its launch following the arrest of a French Jewish officer in 
1894. La Libre Parole achieved a scoop when it reported that Alfred Dreyfus had 
been arrested on charges of being a spy.   
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La Libre Parole printed this image, entitling it “About Judas Dreyfus 
(Figure 1).” The person at the 
center facing towards us is 
the editor-in-chief of La 
Libre Parole himself, 
Drumont. He is shown lifting 
up a man with a hooked nose, 
a traditionally stigmatized 
Jewish image, who is 
wearing a German military 
cap and whose forehead is 
labeled “traitor.” This tiny 
person is obviously Dreyfus. 
Drumont, proudly showing 
off his “prey,” has picked up 
this “traitor” with tweezers 
and is set to dispose him of 
down the drain. Dreyfus was 
depicted and connected with Judas Iscariot throughout the Affair. Drumont is 
unable to suppress his joy over a Jewish officer being arrested on suspicion of 
spying, and no image better captures the grotesque level of his anti-Semitic 
excitement and desire, illustrating what he hopes will happen to Jews.  
The caption reads “French people, for eight years I have repeated this to 
you each day!!!”. In the eight years between the publication of La France juive in 
1886 and the arrest of Dreyfus in 1894, Drumont took every possible opportunity 
to spread his image of the Jews: the image of a “Jewish spy.” Indeed, in La 
France juive he often depicts the “Jewish spy secretly working for Germany,” as 
if predicting the Dreyfus Affair. A French Jewish military officer named Dreyfus 
– a common Jewish surname in France – was arrested for betraying France to 
Germany, and readers of La Libre Parole came to believe that Drumont’s 
prediction had come true. Drumont said that as the French Jew, Dreyfus was a 
foreigner and that as an Alsatian Jew, he was linked to Germany. The “reality” of 
Figure 1, "About Judas Dreyfus", La Libre Parole 
illustrée, November 10, 1894. 
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the arrest of a Jewish officer gave Drumont an unshakeable credibility. Thereafter, 
La Libre Parole took center stage when it came to coverage of the Dreyfus Affair. 
That is to say, Drumont and his readers needed Dreyfus; without the Jew, the anti-
Semite has no basis to exist.  
Through the anti-Semitic campaign of La Libre Parole, public opinion was 
shaped, and people became certain that Dreyfus was guilty. Le Petit Journal, the 
most popular newspaper in France at the time, reported his public military 
degradation on January 5, 1895, with a caption branding Captain Dreyfus a 
“traitor (Figure 2).” The stereotype of the Jewish people as “traitors” was 
scattered throughout France through the famous image created by Le Petit 
Journal. 
French anti-Semitism 
at the end of the nineteenth 
century, originating from 
the publication of La 
France juive, spread among 
the masses in a golden age 
of press, and finally those 
behind these sentiments 
found their desired “prey” 
in Jewish officer Alfred 
Dreyfus. As far as the 
importance of journalism in 
the construction of anti-
Semitism is concerned, 
there is no better illustration 
than this case. As an aside, I 
also must add that it was 
journalism that came to 
Dreyfus’s rescue. About 
four years after the officer’s arrest, on January 13, 1898, the author Émile Zola 
published J’accuse in the daily newspaper L’Aurore, which started a campaign on 
Figure 2."The traitor", Le Petit Journal, January 13, 
1895. 
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behalf of Dreyfus. In the ensuing confrontation between Dreyfusards and anti-
Dreyfusards, Drumont became less significant, and is now all but forgotten. 
However, his anti-Semitism “by words” continues to live on, crossing both 
borders and periods of history.  
Finally, I will conclude my comments by asking Professor Krzywiec the 
following question. Roman Dmowski stayed in Paris from 1891 to 1892. I 
suppose the French anti-Semitism at the end of the nineteenth century may have 
also had some influence on the Polish anti-Semitic movement following 1905. 
Did Domowski’s stay in France during this period have any impact on his 
thoughts about Jewish people? I would particularly like to know whether he had 
interactions that you consider significant during his stay in France.  
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From “Radical Habitus” to Physical Violence 
 
Yuu Nishimura  
  
A brief overview of Kamil Kijek’s work on Jewish youth’s radicalism in interwar 
Poland   
Beginning with my personal story, I first learned about Kamil Kijek’s 
fascinating research at his lecture at the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw in 
2014. The lecture was about the radicalism of Jewish youth in interwar Poland, 
which was a part of his doctoral dissertation that is now published as a book1 and 
forms the basis of today’s lecture. I was then working on my thesis on the Jewish 
Labor Bund, focusing on its educational network involving many young Jews. 
His approach to the youth’s radicalism was very stimulating to me, who, similar 
to many other researchers on the Bund, tended to seek a specific character or 
originality of the Bundist movement and ideology that attracted supporters 
including youth. In contrast, he analyzed Jewish youth’s politicization not from 
the point of view of individual political ideologies, but as a generational 
phenomenon that could be observed across the ideological boundaries between 
various Jewish political movements such as Bundism, communism, Orthodoxy 
(Agudat Yisrael), and various factions of Zionism. 
The youth’s radicalism or the high level of their politicization has long 
been noted by both contemporaries and present-day researchers as characteristic 
of the Jewish society in interwar Poland. Kijek’s approach is novel in his 
successful adoption of the notion of “radical habitus,” which illuminates the 
common features of Jewish youth’s ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. These 
include distaste for a disrupting traditional world, sense of collective inferiority, 
admiration for strength and order, and aspiration for a radical change, the latter 
half of which specifically is summarized as political modernism. While previous 
studies ascribed the radicalization of the youth to a general tendency such as the 
economic crisis and anti-Semitism, Kijek analyzes the mechanisms of the creation 
of this “radical habitus” in a detailed and convincing manner from the point of 
view of cultural and social interaction between Poles and Jews, which developed 
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in the completely new context of the Second Polish Republic, a modern Polish 
nation state that neither Poles nor Jews had ever experienced until the end of 
WWI.  
As indicated in the first part of the lecture, the Second Polish Republic had 
an ambivalent character, particularly according to non-ethnic-Poles. It was a 
democratic nation state promising equal citizenship and the possibility of social 
advancement to its “nation,” i.e., all the citizens within the state border. In reality, 
however, Poles and non-Poles could never be the same – Poland was supposed to 
serve only the interest of the ethnically defined “Polish nation.” This was the 
country where the Jewish youth in question was socialized. The overwhelming 
majority were enrolled in pubic schools, a medium of national integration, where 
they internalized the Polish national symbols such as national(ist) historical 
narrative and heroes, as well as the Polish language and culture. The schools, 
which represented modernity such as scientific order and secular universal 
knowledge in contrast to traditionalism and backwardness of Jewish society, were 
also the place where admiration for modernity was cultivated in Jewish children’s 
minds in an irreversible manner. Radicalization occurred in the course of their 
further socialization after finishing school, or even as early as in school years, 
when they realized that, as Jews, they were excluded from the “Polish nation.” 
Many of them returned to their own Jewish community; however, they did not 
return to an old traditional one but to a newly reconstructed one in a modernist 
sense – for example as a “Jewish nation” – which was propagated by various 
Jewish political groups. Here, ideology itself had less importance than the 
modernist way of thinking and activism. This is proven by the frequent change in 
the youth’s political affiliation.  
In this time’s lecture specifically, I was deeply impressed by the manner in 
which Kijek expanded his scope to include the issue of violence in both physical 
and symbolical terms that was associated with anti-Semitism. Modernism as a 
referential framework here is more refined than in the book that I mentioned. This 
is probably an essential process to reconsider anti-Semitic violence and Jewish 
counters to it in a broader contemporary context of the perceived crisis of 
modernity. This is a promising approach in that it makes it possible to describe 
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the dynamics of the changing relationships between Jews and non-Jews in a wider 
scope, potentially beyond Poland.   
Below is my feedback and some questions on the second half part the 
lecture. 
 
Possibility of interplay between violence in Poland and that in Palestine 
Kijek’s point is that the counter-violence of Jewish youth toward 
anti-Semitic violence – both physical in the form of pogrom and symbolical in the 
form of verbal assault and defamation – was affected by a modernist way of 
thinking whose essential components included admiration for power and strength, 
as well as belief in the need for violent struggles for a radical change to the world. 
I suppose that Polish youth too were affected by this modernist idea, particularly 
when they envisioned the future of the Polish national community. We could even 
say that it was characteristic of the contemporary ethno-nationalism in Central 
and Eastern Europe in general. I found his argument that this trend was 
internalized by Polish Jewish youth and had primal importance in their 
radicalization and positive attitude toward violence to be convincing, but 
simultaneously, I cannot help thinking about another factor that may have had no 
less importance than political modernism in Poland and contemporary Europe – 
influence of the events in Yishuv in Eretz Israel (Palestine).  
Although in a very different context, attacks toward Jews by Palestinian 
Arabs had intermittently occurred from the early 1920s, about a decade before the 
rise of anti-Semitic violence in post-Piłsudski Poland. They culminated as the 
Arab Revolt in Palestine in 1936–1939, which coincided with the period of 
brutalization of Polish anti-Semitism. As we know, the bloody situation in 
Palestine, most famously symbolized by the death of Joseph Trumpeldor, was one 
of the causes of growing militarism among Polish Zionists. My question concerns 
the potential impact of the violence in Palestine, its image, and interpretation on 
Jewish response toward the ongoing violence in Poland. More concretely, I would 
like to raise two questions. The first is “How and to what extent did the Jewish 
youth in Poland in general, regardless of their Political affiliation, perceive the 
violence in Yishuv?” Was this type of news familiar to them in their everyday life 
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(via newspaper, etc.)? How did they interpret it in their modernist imagination? 
The second is “Is there any possibility that the Jews-Arabs relations that young 
Jews in Poland imagined ought to be in the future affected the way in which Jews 
related to Poles as their current neighbor?”  
As for the second question, I am also curious about the inverse effect, that 
is, the potential impact of the changing Polish-Jewish relations in Poland in the 
1930s on determining the manner in which Jews related to Palestinian Arabs at 
that time and afterward. This might be difficult to estimate, since most of those 
radicalized Jewish youth perished during the Holocaust, without ever arriving at 
Palestine. However, even so, I cannot help assuming some continuity between the 
political culture of young Polish-Jews on the eve of WWII, which was 
characterized by radicalism and militarism, and that of the newly born Israel. This 
might be an oversimplified analogical assumption, but as indicated in the paper – 
or so I understood –, if we could assume that the “radical habitus” driven by 
political modernism was a far-reaching phenomenon beyond the borders of 
Poland, we may be able to consider seriously the possibility of exportation of this 
current into Yishuv in somewhat diverse ways and of its long-term impact on 
Jews-Palestinians relationships. If Polish culture, or Polish nationalism in 
particular, was a “‘mirror’ through which young Jews looked at […] the situation 
of Jewish nationalism,” as Kijek points to in his paper for the lecture, I think the 
Poles-Jews relationships may have been a mirror as well through which they 
looked at, interpreted, and envisioned the Arabs-Jews relationships. 
 
Counter-violence: generational gap and social strata  
Another interesting part of the lecture is about the generational gap in the 
attitude toward real physical violence. Especially interesting point to me in 
Kijek’s argument is that the Jewish Labor Bund’s determined gesture against the 
Przytyk pogrom, which was shown in organizing the well-known general strike2, 
was rather of symbolical character, and that they did not take real actions of 
counter-violence or self-defense at the places where the violence occurred. Taking 
into consideration the fact that the Bundist militia, an official self-defense group 
under the control of the Bund Central Committee, had been actively involved in 
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physical confrontation with anti-Semites on such occasions as May Day 
demonstrations and rallies at which the right-wing Poles attacked the Jews, the 
Bundist attitude toward anti-Semitic violence is not to be characterized as only 
symbolical. It is true, however, the protest strike after the Przytyk pogrom had 
highly symbolic meaning; calling for the strike, and for a socialists and workers’ 
general congress to combat anti-Semitism after that (eventually banned by Polish 
authority), they protested not only against pogrom itself but also against such 
anti-Semitic policies as boycott of Jewish labor force and promotion of 
emigration of Jews from Poland. More significantly, they called also for Polish 
workers’ solidarity in a determined manner. In my view, this Bundist (symbolic) 
attitude was consistent with the party’s fundamental idea of doikeyt (hereness), or 
their program of national cultural autonomy, for it showed clearly their emotional 
ties to their Polish neighbors and their will for further coexistence with them.  
If this assumption is correct, it will be interesting to consider the place of 
the notion of doikeyt of the Bund specifically, and the vision of so-called diaspora 
nationalism in general, in the light of Kijek’s argument that underscores the 
“generational key” in understanding a Jewish stance on violence. If symbolical 
resistance against anti-Semitism – in the Bund’s case it was basically determined 
by the veteran party leaders – can be interpreted as demonstration of will to 
coexist, can we assume that physical counter-violence including revenge actions, 
which were initiated by youth in the Przytyk’s case, indicate abandonment rather 
than holding of this will? The radicalization of Polish-Jewish youth that can be 
seen in their increasing positive attitudes toward physical confrontation with 
Poles may indicate a deep perception gap between younger and older generation 
on the future of Jews in Poland. It seems that the vision of so-called diaspora 
nationalism that had been held not only by the Bund, but also to some extent by 
the entire older generation of Jewish political activists including Zionists, was lost 
sight of among the majority of the younger generation socialized in the Second 
Polish Republic.  
While this is merely a statement of my impressions, what follows includes 
my questions on the same part of the lecture. Whereas Kijek’s analysis based on 
“generational” key is convincing, as for physical counter-violence and not 
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symbolical one, I suspect that there might have been some difference in the 
attitudes among the younger generation itself, corresponding to the social strata 
they belonged to and their degree of acculturation. It is true that symbolic 
acculturation, as well as exposure to symbolic violence, was a universal 
experience among Jewish youth, particularly because of their enrolment in Polish 
public schools. However, the degree of acculturation differed according to 
accessibility to advanced education, which depends on the economic condition of 
individual family the youth came from. This also determined the frequency and 
quality of their social contacts to Poles in everyday life. Taking vocational life as 
an example, the range of social contacts of Jewish lower classes engaged in small 
business such as handicraft and retail, which absorbed the majority of Jewish 
workers, including an increasing number of young and even child workers, was 
limited almost exclusively within the Jewish environment (expect for contacts 
with customers), due to the virtual segregation in the labor market of the Second 
Polish Republic3. Their contact with Poles must have been different from that of 
Jewish university students, who Kijek mentions in the paper as “in average most 
acculturated” and “most consistent group physically answering to the anti-Semite 
attackers.” If so, how was the attitude toward anti-Semitic attacks of Jewish youth 
who belonged to a lower or the lowest class with limited degree of social contacts 
to Poles and of cultural acculturation? I do agree that radicalism or political 
modernism was shared by the entire younger generation beyond the class borders, 
but isn’t radicalism as thoughts and gestures different from resorting to real 
physical violence? – If so, there would be little wonder if attitudes toward the 
latter differed among the same generation. In connection to this question, I am 
also curious about the social structure of membership of self-defense groups 
formed during the Przytyk pogrom. Kijek indicates that they were associated with 
revisionist Zionism, left-wing Zionism, Mizrachi, or communism. Did the social 
structure of the membership of these political groups then have any specific 
features? 
    
                                                     
1 Kamil Kijek, Dzieci modernizmu: Świadomość i socjalizacja polityczna młodzieży żydowskiej 
w Polsce międzywojennej (Wrocław, 2017). 
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2 On the half-day general strike called by the Bund in protesting Przytyk pogrom, and on the 
Bundist response to other anti-Semitic incidents including organizing self-defense groups, see, 
S[ofie] Dubnov-Erlikh et al. eds., Di geshikhite fun bund,vol 4 (New York, 1972), 203–10; 
Emanuel Nowogrodzki, The Jewish Labor Bund in Poland: From its Emergence as an 
Independent Political Party until the Beginning of World War II, 1915–1939, trans. and ed. 
Markus Nowogrodzki (Rockville, MD, 2001), 217–54; Bernard Goldstein, Twenty Years with 
the Jewish Labor Bund: A Memoir of Interwar Poland, trans. and ed. Marvin S. Zuckerman 
(West Lafayette, IN, 2016), 359–77; Bernard K. Johnpoll, The Politics of Futility: The General 
Jewish Workers Bund of Poland, 1917–1943 (Ithaca, NY, 1967), 211–6; Gertrud Pickhan, 
‘Gegen den Strom’: Der Allgemeine Jüdische Arbeiterbund ‘Bund’ in Polen, 1918–1939 
(Stuttgart and München, 2001), 304–14; Emanuel Melzer, No Way Out: The Politics of Polish 
Jewry, 1935–1939 (Cincinnati, OH, 1997), 58–60. 










点からポーランドの反ユダヤ主義を研究しており、近著（Polska bez Żydów: 
Studia z dziejów idei, wyobrażeń i praktyk antysemickich na ziemiach polskich 






































































































































































Scott Uryの研究（Barricades and Banners: The Revolution of 1905 and the 




















































































であるが、定義はロジャー・グリフィン（Roger Griffin, Modernism and 









































modernizmu: Świadomość i socjalizacja polityczna młodzieży żydowskiej w 



























































答えていると思う（Jerzy Jedlicki, Jakiej cywilizacji Polacy potrzebują: Studia z 
dziejów idei i wyobraźni XIX wieku (Polska XIX i XX wieku), Warzawa, 1988／A 
Suburb of Europe: Nineteenth-Century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization, 




























































































（イェドヴァブネ事件を検証した Jan Tomasz Gross, Neighbors: The 










究成果をまとめた論集が刊行されている。Konrad Zieliński and Kamil Kijek 
eds., Przemoc antyżydowska i konteksty akcji pogromowych na ziemiach polskich 

















The Polish ‘Borderlands’ (Kresy) as a Space without the Jews?  
The Jewish Menace, ‘National Revolution’ from Below and Above  
at the Eve of WWII 
 
Grzegorz Krzywiec  
 
Fascist sub-culture on the Polish soil? 
The questions about the nature of Polish right wing radicalism or Polish 
fascism as such and its role in Polish political life in 1930s are more easily asked 
than answered, mostly because research is thin on the ground 1 . Apart from 
ideology and political thought analytical studies of party membership and party 
leadership not mentioning every day activism are in fact very scarce, indeed. 
Moreover, historians, and social scientists at large, generally ignore the Polish 
contribution to the legacy of fascism in the broader region (e.g. R. Griffin, A. 
Kallis, R. Paxton, and S. G. Payne2). Expert literature typically treats the fascist 
movement in Poland as a footnote with little bearing on the political or cultural 
history of Poland. In most cases the relevant researchers focus on the National 
Radical Camp (ca. 5,000 active members), which was outlawed in 1934 after a 
couple months of legal activity3. Thus, my talk wish to make a revision to this 
paradigm, and therefore challenges the presumptions of the marginal role and 
imitative character of the Polish fascist movement. My approach repudiates the 
strictly political and somehow ‘reductionist’ lens of present-day historiography – 
indeed, I maintain that Polish fascism flourished in a plethora of vibrant cultural 
and social milieux. Fascism in Poland and in Eastern Europe continues to be an 
extremely slippery ground for research. Notwithstanding the numerous works on 
the nationalist movement in Poland, and the far fewer interpretations of it (among 
recently exceptions see M. S. Kunicki), Polish fascism has proved to be a 
conundrum, both in Poland and abroad4. Scholarship concerning fascism and 
right-wing radicalism is still singularly vulnerable to subjective viewpoints and is 
often abused as a weapon in current polemical battles. No mentioning that even 
though some specialists acknowledged the gravity of the problem, for a long time 
there was no need for any further discussion.  
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Therefore the attitude presented here is rather to concentrate on local 
rightist sub-culture and the biggest political party in the Polish lands at the same 
time than all transitions of ideas, exchanges and straightforward borrowings either 
from Mussolini’s Italy or later on from Nazi Germany5. At the very beginning, it’s 
worthwhile to introduce a certain number of facts about one of the lesser known 
fascist movement or better to say phenomenon of the thirties, and then using that 
other data in an attempt to begin a sort of discussion of which problems or topics 
need more thorough analysis and deeper understanding. 
Therefore the focus here is getting at the late 1920. One of the nationalist 
camp’s early reactions to Józef Piłsudski’s coup d’état was to establish the Camp 
of Great Poland (Obóz Wielkiej Polski – OWP) in 1927. Initially a coalition of 
rightist groups opposing Piłsudski quickly commenced to transform itself into a 
para-fascist mass movement. In accord with the intentions of its founder and the 
main ideologue of Polish right Roman Dmowski, it was patterned on Italian 
fascism 6 . Dmowski wielded direct power in it from the beginning. At the 
ideological level, the Camp was the realization of his pre-war ideas: the belief that 
the political scene was broken into two antagonistic camps and that one, the ‘anti-
national’, was composed of ‘destructive elements’ with the Jews at the first place 
and should be systematically marginalized and subjected to ‘moral terror’. The 
Bolshevik Revolution, which was regarded among National Democracy circles, 
as a ‘Jewish product’, gave this approach an even more radical, not to say extreme, 
dimension. All these recommendations were to be found in Dmowski’s two most 
important publications of this period, Government Issues (Zagadnienie rządu) and 
Church, Nation and the State (Kościół, Naród i państwo) (1927). 
One of the first steps toward building a mass antiparliamentary grouping 
was to work for the favour of the Catholic Church. However, Dmowski’s own 
defense of the Church was characterized by a certain ambiguity. It seems that he 
saw the Catholicism primarily as an ally in the struggle against all tendencies 
taking their roots from the tradition of the Enlightenment and as the sole power 
that had successfully resisted the influence of the ‘Jewish spirit’. It may also be 
supposed that the genesis of this document was Pious XI’s condemnation of the 
‘Action Française’ doctrine. For European Catholics, Eastern European the same, 
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this was a shock. It is worth remembering the very practical dimension of 
Dmowski’s texts. In contrast to their religiously indifferent predecessors, the new 
generation of nationalist youth which appeared in the early 1920s wanted to 
combine their nationalist credo with their attachment to Catholicism7.  
The appearance of the Camp of Great Poland (OWP) and its further sharp 
rise led to changes in Piłsudski’s semi-dictatorship as well. When parliamentary 
elections took place in March 1928, the result exceeded the worst expectations of 
the Endeks; National Democracy as an umbrella movement had lost more than 
half of its mandate in parliament, coming far behind the groups supporting 
Piłsudski’s regime. This defeat finally buried the conservative line in the 
movement, giving a green light to the radical youth led by Dmowski himself.  
In the early 1930s – the symbolic date here is 1931 and the first wave of 
university strikes and massive anti-Semitic unrest organized by the young 
generation of nationalists – the Camp of Great Poland took the initiative for the 
whole Endeks8. Dmowski’s plan for ‘organizing politics’ and ‘a new selection’ 
with the necessity for introducing a single-party dictatorship in the form of a 
government of the ‘national oligarchy’, in order to moral and biological 
regeneration of the nation, received a broad response, particularly from the youth. 
In the spring 1928 was established the Youth Movement of the OWP (Ruch 
Młodych Obozu Wielkiej Polski – RM-OWP) that became a way of registering 
anger and economic tensions about the changes in the reborn Poland among 
young generation. Most energetic followers of whole movement have come from 
both towns and cities, mainly the middle-class youth, white-collar workers, 
largely from the upper and well-off layers of society. But first of all they were 
students. Nearly all chairmen, high-ranking officials hailed from university-
student milieu from the early 1920s. They all fought in the reconstruction wars, 
but the most numerous group was that of the veterans of the Polish-Bolshevik war 
of the 1920s. Crucial point in their program was of the total elimination of the 
Jews from Polish public life (numerus nullus). Tadeusz Bielecki, one of the main 
leaders of OWP, at this time also a private secretary of Dmowski once declared: 
“We cut ourselves definitely from the Jews. We made a pure Aryan student’s 
republic”9. Ever since the late 1920 he was very right: the university was divided 
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into the dominant Polish majority and the other minority groups. There was no 
chance to be a Jew even self-declared Polish patriot and the member of 
nationwide student’s mutual aid organization (Bratnia Pomoc) at the same time. 
For the very first time it turned out a generation that imagined not only its 
homeland but also a world without Jews. A combative anti-Semitism of this group 
served not only as anti-Jewish measure but also as a tool of keeping its members 
in constant readiness for coming national revolution and showdown also with the 
ruling regime. There came first attempts to create a genuine, healthy Polish-
Catholic and a new modern culture appropriate for the reborn, racially purged 
national community and the task of creating an alternative total ‘culture’ based on 
the organic nation. ‘Youth’ in contrast to the whole Camp was based in 
paramilitary organization (60-80 thousands armed young members bearing batons 
and sometime firearms, marching with flags and emblems through towns and 
villages and brawling with leftist organizations)10.  
In a couple of years the Camp became a powerful movement, in 1930 
reaching the enormous number (also taking under account that it was in 
opposition to the ruling power) of 250,000 members. From the very beginning, 
the Camp was organized by paramilitary rules and standards. It included a 
‘fighting organization’ constructed by secretive, hierarchical rules. At every 
lowest local branch of the Camp were created two independent departments: 
‘Jewish department’ producing a mass anti-Semitic propaganda and ‘Economic 
action department’ (Wydział Gospodarczy) respectively focusing on solely a anti-
Jewish boycott campaigns as such.  
 
Toward a ‘national revolution’ 
Although a new political offensive at the beginning of the 1930s left the 
country facing a civil war, the Sanacja regime successfully stifled that nationalist 
mobilization. An attempted repeat of Hitler’s ‘nationalist revolution’, which had 
made a great impression on the Polish ‘nationalist camp’ like elsewhere in Europe 
of those days, especially in Eastern Europe – that is, the tactic of dividing public 
opinion and presenting the ruling elite and namely Piłsudski as the guardian of the 
Jewish population – never got off the ground11.  
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The Camp of Great Poland did not achieve much in political sense of the 
word. It did not manage to unite the right in opposition to Piłsudski. It did not 
acquire the unequivocal support of the Catholic Church and although a large part 
of the lower clergy supported the group, the hierarchy as whole maintained a 
certain reserve. Nevertheless, as it expanded, this early version of Polish fascism 
revealed its social and ideological physiognomy. Then the students’ rebellion of 
the early 1930s broke up in university’s centres as a protest against overcrowding 
and poor material conditions in higher education. The young nationalist leaders, 
amongst them all future Polish fascist leaders (e.g. Tadeusz Bielecki, Jan Mosdorf, 
Jan Rembieliński, Zdzisław Stahl, Wojciech Wasiutyński), succeeded in reducing 
a set of actual problems into a simple political message: ridding of ‘foreigners’ 
from universities. There was only one group that composed a visible scapegoat 
there. There were Jews or Poles of Jewish origins. 
At the end of 1932 and beginning of 1933, the creeping nationalist revolt 
was put down by the Sanacja who gradually made the Camp illegal in various 
regions of the country. For many of the ‘Youngs’ this spectacular defeat of the 
nationalist movement was the signal that they had to do something on their own. 
That rebellion of the new shoots against the old roots set the stage for the 
emergence in 1934 of the National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny – 
ONR) 12 , the first openly fascist political party in Poland, and also for the 
breakdown of the nationalist right, which lasted to the end of the 2nd Republic. 
After banning the organization much of these activists with Dmowski’s blessing 
leaked to the mainstream National Party. 
The Polish nationalist right of the second part of 1930s composed of nearly 
all main trends of authoritarian and proto-fascist and fascist that existed all over 
the Europe, from an extreme nationalist, par excellence anti-Semitic but still anti-
German Dmowski’s the National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe – SN), openly-
totalitarian and populist in Strasserian manner – Bolesław Piasecki’s ONR-
Falanga, Catholic corporal, authoritarian ONR-ABC, the Zadruga movement – a 
racialist group rooted in the pre-historian mystic Slav history to name a few. For a 
nearly entire generation the Camp was a crucial training school of ideas and 
values but as well a reservoir of leadership cadre. First of all, crucial among these 
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activists and believers was a belief in violence, as well in physical terror, as an 
ethical and a regenerative force in itself and as the main key to national renewal 
and future unity.  
Paradoxically enough, on the other side, the Sanacja’s regime after 
Piłsudski’s death in 1935 has assumed a shape of more fascist politics. This para-
fascist style, or ‘fascisation’ on the post- Piłsudski-ites’side was to have its brief 
heyday in 1937 with the foundation of the Camp of National Unity (Obóz 
Zjednoczenia Narodowego – OZN) and so called the ‘consolidation process’13. In 
general, from the late 1930s the Sanacja camp began to disintegrate. The only one 
binder for all diversified groups of interest was self-preservation. The threat from 
Nazi Germany after March 1939, was reinforced this tendency. Yet, you have 
keep it in mind a general trend still seemed to go in to direction from policy state 
and autocracy to totalitarian, homogenous ethnic regime. 
Interestingly enough, many former members of the Camp of Greater 
Poland (one can assume 1/3 of the whole generation) leaked somehow into the 
Sanacja, eventually. Some of them officially as the members of the Association of 
Young Nationalist (Związek Młodych Narodowców) that began to cooperate with 
the regime since 1934 on, many others on the more unofficial basis. The fervent, 
radical anti-Semitism of all these groups was one but the constant feature. So 
called the ‘national revolution’ (rewolucja narodowa), that meant a Jew-hatred 
treated not only as a chief instrument for public persuasion but as well a sort of 
world-view, was in common in all these movements. By radically diminishing 
‘Jewish influence’ or put it directly as ‘Jewish menace” or ‘non-Poles’ it 
postulated a creation of radically new society and new people inhabiting them 
(the new Poles), free from social and cultural ills that were born by ‘false’ 
modernity (in its ‘pathological’ version largely being ‘Jewish creation’). This sort 
of anti-Semitism had deeply, one might reckon, if not as a ‘redemptive’ at least of 
eliminationalist nature.  
Here it is a space to make a stop for some methodological explanation. As 
a matter of fact neither political nor institutional keys seem to be enough to 
explain how and what extent in fact radical rights ideas turned out both in main 
opposition party, and in the government at the same time. And how one could 
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explain such tremendous appeal of extreme nationalism to the Polish youth 
specifically, and how one might better situate the Polish case alongside other 
mass rightist movements of the day?  
‘Cultural’ instruments adopted to the Polish case facilitates to grasp why 
both paramilitary nationalist activists of various kinds and the influential grouping 
among the Sanacja regime share a desire for a regeneration which ought to be 
simultaneously spiritual and physical, moral and political. In this particular 
situation a political violence was not a mean to a particular end, but it was as well 
model of a living.  
 
The nationalist revolution and anti-Semitic terror of the mid-1930s from below: 
The Lublin province as a part of Borderland phenomenon 
By the second half of the 1930s Poland had become the scene of widely 
publicized pogroms and waves of mob violence directed against Jews. Among the 
better known are the events in Grodno on June 7, 1935, Odrzywół from 
November 20-27, 1935, Przytyk March 9, 1936, Mińsk Mazowiecki on June 1, 
1936, Brześć on May 13, 1937, Częstochowa on June 19, 1937, and Bielsko-Biała 
between the 17th and 25th of September 1937, along with a great deal of minor 
events and cases. Between 14 and nearly 100 deaths, far more than 150 acts of 
collective violence, over two-thousands severely beaten and badly cut up persons, 
an inestimable amount of the material loss. Nonetheless, no precise map nor 
dynamic of this anti-Semitic violence has ever been systematically scrutinized14. 
To be sure, the above is only a small part of a broader picture of the political 
violence that erupted in the mid-1930s. However, it shows how a paramilitary 
nationalist sub-culture overshadowed practically the whole of political life not 
only in the centre of the state, but as well in the provinces. 
Not challenging and denigrating the importance of factors such as the 
Great Depression, the deep economic crisis in the Polish countryside, the afore-
mentioned authoritarian, if not a para-fascist turn of the late Sanacja regime, 
overwhelming peasant dissatisfaction with government, and the huge scale of 
popular protests, widespread anti-Jewish prejudices among the local populace, the 
place of anti-Jewish prejudice in the actions of government and among local elites, 
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the political fragmentation and radicalization of Poland’s Jewish community, and 
a great many other particular endemic factors, the fundamental question which 
returns here is how all these ideas constituted and developed among elites and 
were catapulted from the cities and academic centres into the countryside. The 
next is how and to what extent the Sanacja regime changed as such.  
On more practical terms, the Poland of those days was an overwhelmingly 
peasant country (nearly 70% of the population lived in the province). What were 
the mechanisms that led from words to deeds; from speeches, pamphlets, and one-
day publications, the nationwide hate campaigns of newspapers and the mass 
media to physical terror and daily assaults on Jews?15 
In this regard one has to take a step back to the first massive wave of anti-
Jewish violence at the beginning of 1930, and which began at Polish universities16. 
In order to demonstrate how, when, and to what extent anti-Semitic propaganda 
became a part of the meticulous tactics and systemic political strategy directed to 
foment clashes between the Jewish and non-Jewish population in the province, 
between ‘the enemy of the nation’ and ‘the Christian national community’. 
According to this scheme, the possible escalation of violence could become a 
self-perpetuating social process that could be easily explained to peasants through 
the anti-Semitic ideology of the Camp of Great Poland and then the National 
Party still dominant political organization. Thus violence was not only a physical, 
generational experience for many, but also a cognitive and emotional act 17 
through which a telltale radical anti-Semitic ideology and regenerational project 
following closely behind could be popularized in the country.  
According to the government reports, in the province, especially young 
peasants and young clergy, there were two social groups among which ‘Young’ 
Endeks succeeded in finding the biggest number of new followers. The years 
1930-1932 were a time when the world economic crisis was already strongly felt 
in the Polish countryside, in particular among peasants. Peasants felt the 
economic collapse of early 1930s most deeply and for the longest time. But 
despite all this, and despite traditional superstitions that the Christian peasants had 
about Jews, their economic activity, and in general about the modern ‘Jewish 
economic oppression’, these matters did not seem central for the local Endeks’ 
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political rhetoric until 193118. The idea of Jews being the overriding cause of the 
plight of ‘Christian’ peasants did not have to be invented, but rather brought back 
to the centre of peasant-oriented political communication. ‘The Jew’ as the deadly 
‘enemy within’ hiding behind everything that was harmful was therefore taught. 
And this ‘translation’(K. Kijek) was done through intense agitation, and then first 
and foremost by physical violence19. Similarly among the Catholic priest fears 
and dissatisfaction arose especially when the left of the Sanacja establishment 
tried to enforce civil wedding procedures (1932). This was a trigger point not only 
for the Catholic hierarchy, but also for many young priests who had just appeared 
for the very first time on the public scene. A huge moral panic campaign 
overshadowed the Catholic mass media of those days20.  
However, the idea of Jews as the main ‘problem of the Polish economy,’ 
and the main reason for the misery in the countryside, had started to appear in the 
local OWP gatherings at the end of 1931. Just before, in the summer of 1931, 
crucial political decisions had been made at the top of Endek hierarchy. On the 
Central Council of OWP in Poznań, the main leader and ideologue of ND, Roman 
Dmowski, called for an urgent initiation of ‘anti-Jewish riots’ in order to sustain 
an anti-revolutionary mood among the ‘Christian populace’ 21 . In the central 
Endek press such as Myśl Narodowa were published articles such as Stanisław 
Pieńkowski’s calling for ‘numerus nullus’ for the Jews.22 The ‘Youth’ supported 
these callings overwhelmingly. On November 26, 1931, the Warsaw-based 
Central Board of the Camp sent a memo to all of the OWP provincial and regional 
branches. The circular instructed party activists to use it promote the new policy 
with the simplest possible slogans. Short sentences, a few emotionally loaded 
words were perfect in attracting the attention of the lowest classes, mainly 
peasants, of whom many in the middle and older generations were either 
functional illiterate or outright illiterate.  
The spring of 1933 saw organized boycotts that promoted a large amount 
of leaflets in the villages and provincial town centres, usually during weekly fairs, 
fest days, and public holidays23. In 1933 when Adolf Hitler came to power in 
Germany and right away introduced anti-Jewish policies, he was attentively and 
widely observed by the Polish right wing, which sought examples that many 
94 
would be eager to follow24. Already by the spring of 1933, Nazi successes were 
widely hailed as examples to follow during political meetings throughout the 
entire Kielce, Częstochowa, and first and foremost the Mazovian voivodeships25. 
In this regard the dissolution of the OWP (March 1933) and the integration 
of its young and radical members into the ‘adult’ National Party (SN)  had a 
crucial, long-standing importance. Against the intention of the authorities this 
introduced the most extreme version of anti-government opposition and radical 
anti-Semitic ideology into the midst of the adult, nationalist mainstream political 
party. After wave of anti-Semitic events at the universities and the murder of 
Minister of Internal Affairs Bronisław Pieracki on June 15 1934 which was at 
first falsely attributed to ONR, the latter was disbanded by the authorities. The 
organization went underground, but in various regions it tried to act through 
connections with their ‘Young’ colleagues who decided to stay in the mainstream 
SN. And the SN itself, practically speaking, had moved into an even more openly 
fascist direction in April 1934. An even more striking evolution took place in the 
local ground, in Kielce voivodeship, as Kijek has meticulously documented and 
analyzed, and in Podlasie (the north- eastern part of the Lublin voivodeship) 26 
and in Lublin itself 27 , Masovia, Łódź in the centre of Poland, and almost 
everywhere.  
It is important to note that both anti-Jewish radicalism and political 
violence as used by the ‘Young’ of all groupings were one of most important 
tools for gaining dominance in the whole National Party. Frequent 
communications with the larger public to advertise their activities gave the urban 
and peasant youth in particular reason to ‘fight’ the Jewish threat and the ‘Jewish 
puppet’ (żydowskie wojtki), that is, the Sanacja regime.  
In this regards, political violence or better to say everyday acts of physical 
terror were an inseparable part of the anti-Jewish boycott campaign. From the 
very beginning the ‘Jews’ had ‘overwhelmed’ pages of the boycott bulletin and 
party leaflets which scared its readers from every possible corner. Among many 
other things they were accused of making police attack the Camp gatherings, of 
‘de-Polonizing Poles’ through sensational press and other forms of popular 
culture, pornography, film, and even radio, still being real rulers of the country. 
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The propaganda either openly or by default advocated the usage of violence 
against the police, left wing, and the Jews.  
Jews threatened with attacks would defend themselves, either through 
appealing to the state authorities, or through direct physical self-defense28. The 
authorities’ interventions were presented by nationalists as proof that the Sanacja 
regime ‘serves the Jews’ (some police reports from the head of Garwolin county 
cited that the leaflets name the government as ‘Judeo-sanacja’ (Żydo-sanacja)29. 
This was supposed to happen in crowded places, the best ones would be the fairs 
where large numbers of locals convened. Physical confrontation in crowed places 
created confusion, chaos, and the engagement of bystanders. This was also to 
make use of prevailing traditional ethno-religious division; fights between ‘Jews’ 
and ‘Polish-Catholics’ would inevitably bring more and more peasants into the 
fray.  
Although all these publications, as well as the leaflets and speeches of the 
young Endek activists in the other parts of province had slowly translated ‘boycott’ 
into ‘fight’ and ‘struggle’. It had consistently presented figures like the dead 
student Stanisław Wacławski (‘stoned to death by the Jews’ as leaflets said) or 
Jan Grotkowski, who were murdered during the anti-Semitic wave of violence in 
Wilno  and Lwów, respectively, and many other victims of nationalist brawls as 
national heroes and martyrs to educate locals about the events taking place at 
Polish universities and in the cities. Next to the martyrs (e.g., Wacławski was 
depicted as a peasant but at the same time a hero and martyr who strove for ‘a 
better future’30), boycotters as such were presented as new men imbued with the 
qualities of the ‘national soldier’: discipline, the spirit of sacrifice for their 
country and the cause (Greater Poland, Wielka Polska), certain spirit of 
camaraderie, and obedience to flag, to the national hierarchy, to the Church, and 
to the leaders. 
As police and the other governmental reports show, the use of summer 
vacation and subsequent arrivals of many students and older school pupils from 
cities like Lublin and Zamość (the two academic centres in the region), visiting 
their families, they tried to organize anti-Jewish riots31. As time these rather 
grassroots initiatives went on there would suddenly become a full-blown 
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nationwide strategy. The Jews were widely attacked and then beaten in trains and 
in public transport, in parks, in the open, and on the roads32. This also frequently 
happened after anti-Semitic lectures organized by the nationalist agitators. Jews 
would be attacked in order to cause violent reactions of the state police against 
attackers. Then, the police and authorities could be embarrassed and accused of 
fighting with Christian, ethnic, ‘indigenous’ (as it was often said) Poles. 
Therefore the supposedly ‘peaceful fight’ in the form of economic boycott was 
presented along with the categories of most radical form of anti-Semitism, where 
the Jew was an absolute and deadly menace; a phantom threat standing behind the 
gravest calamities and sins of the world. In this regard the summer of 1933 (right 
before outlawing of the OWP), and creation of the National Radical Camp (ONR) 
(1934), and some further seismic events on the Polish political scene, seem to be a 
crucial, if not decisive for the creation of the new political culture of violence. 
This lesson of the years 1931-1933 and the generational experience marked 
a significant improvement of this political strategy via nationalist scaremongering 
and first and foremost via violence. An ‘economy department’ was established in 
every district of the National Party and was devoted strictly to the anti-Jewish 
campaign. Any conflict and fight in which Jews took the initiative or just 
defended themselves was to be widely publicized. In fact the nationalist press did 
not hide those events. On the contrary every single episode was disseminated on a 
nationwide level. This solution helped to cover the violent initiative of the 
‘Young’, and show it as a mere act of self-defense, not of their own, but of 
peasants and ‘simple fellow Christians’ not even connected with the nationalist 
movement. The second part of this new strategy was to focus on social space 
were anti-Jewish and pro-nationalist agitation would take place. This had 
appeared in village and small town fairs before, but now it became a systemic 
solution, a conscious act of building a particular way of political communication33. 
The Endeks would not always indulge in violence openly, but would secretly 
provoke it, trying to affect its non-sympathizers. Here looms the huge problem of 
various groups engaged in acts of violence. 
The police and the starosta’s reactions to this violence, and Jewish 
examples, whether in the form of police complaints or in the form of self-defense, 
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were very much welcomed. They helped to promote the main elements of the 
nationalist ideology, of the ‘idea of Jewish rule’ in Poland and in the state 
institutions, police among them, serving their interests against the interests of 
‘Christian society’. In this way the Endecja ideology started to become a self-
fulfilling prophecy, finding its confirmation in ‘facts’, and as such, it was now 
easier to promote it among the peasants34. During all these actions the agitators 
were also talking about ‘lousy Jews killing true Poles’, resorting to the image of 
nationalist martyrs. Other posters and leaflets distributed at the countryside had 
slogans such as ‘Poland for Poles, not for Jews’ and ‘Down with the Jews. It is 
time to finish them off ’ and ‘As long as Jews will be in Poland, people will be 
poor. Beat up the Jews!’ or ‘Death to Judeo-communism’ and even ‘Death to the 
Jews’35. Besides that means of agitation, the National Party also used the annual 
Corpus Christi processions or pilgrimages to Jasna Góra (Clarus Mons, a Marian 
sanctuary in the south of Poland). During them the ‘Young’ under the safekeeping 
of young priests, usually marched in their organizational uniforms in military 
style. Almost every state holiday as e.g. August 15th as a remembrance day for 
the victory over Bolshevik Russia in 1920 and the main festivity in the Endek’s 
calendar, was used to beat the Jews in public places. According to the police 
reports in Lublin and its neighbourhood, such as Bychawa, a small town in the 
Lublin county, a typical example of the provincial settlement where Poles, Jews, 
and some other minorities lived side by side from ages in an ambivalent 
symbiosis36, a band of the nationalist students, mostly visitors from Lublin, on 
that day beat almost 100 Jews unconscious37.  
This scenario was systematically reproduced after 1935 in many events, 
mostly in so-called pogroms (from Odrzywół in 1935 to Brześć in the autumn 
1937) with but one significant change, when the state authorities (meaning police 
officers, the state system of justice, for example the starosta) stepped back and 
actually ceded at least a certain monopoly of violence to the paramilitary groups. 
Especially the infamous ‘Indeed’ speech of the Prime Minister Felicjan Sławoj-
Składkowski from June 4 1936 when he accepted the ‘economic struggle’ against 
the Jews, but not the physical attacks and destruction of their property, needs to 
be taken in consideration. The government announced openly its preference for 
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the emigration of about 90% of Poland’s Jews which were meant to prevent the 
pogroms organized by the nationalists. The police still tried to curb attempts of 
mass-violence but treated the boycotts of Jewish businesses as a legitimate 
economic alternative. At the same time the parliament passed a ban on kosher 
slaughter, although it was never implemented full-scale and the professional 
organizations had massively to register their ‘Jewish’ members. For instance, the 
‘Aryanization’ of the doctors’ association in the Lublin voivodeship was 
implemented entirely. At the Catholic University of Lublin, which had no Jews 
within student body at all, the rector nonetheless still called for numerus nullus.  
It should not be surprising that the local state representatives understood 
the shift in the government in very ambiguous way: in a few cases they reacted 
brutally as earlier in the early 1930s, in others they even assisted the boycott 
agitators and nationalist armed groups and thugs, in most cases they just 
observed38. In some districts such as in Zamość in the eastern part of the Lublin 
voivodeship the police functionaries officially guarded the boycotters and treated 
complaints submitted by the Jews as acts of provocation39. This triggered a scale 
of violence and an amount of petty acts of aggression to an extent not seen before.  
 
The national revolution from above: The Borderland’s experience 
As mentioned earlier, the flow of ‘Young’ politicians also changed the late 
Sanacja’s politics as such. There were various levels of this engagement of the 
regime in radical rightist politics. The second half of 1936 in particular witnessed 
several major transformations in Polish political culture. For considerations here, 
the most important and meaningful seems to be two of them: the role and position 
of Edward Rydz-Śmigły and his inner circle in the political establishment and the 
cooperation of different segments of the nationalist political scene with the 
regime. 
Most spectacular in this process that proceeded until WWII seems to be the 
creation of the youth branch of the OZN, the Union of Young Poland (Związek 
Młodej Polski – ZMP) and the appointment of Jerzy Rutkowski, the OWP former 
activist and then Bolesław Piasecki’s close associate as its boss. In Rutkowski’s 
own words the aims of the new organization would be the implementation of the 
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‘national breakthrough’ by the youth into public life and the constant struggle 
with communists, freemasons, and all ‘enemies within the nation’. As regards the 
‘Jewish question’ the ‘chief of staff ’ of the Union called for the complete 
elimination of the Jews from the public sphere and saw the ‘Jewish problem’ to 
be solved through mass and forced emigration. The publications of the new 
organization demanded that responsibility for the ‘new Poland’ has to be taken by 
the soldiers and first and foremost by the young generations. All these groups 
were to form a coalition of pro-state nationalist forces in order to crush the 
Folksfront, the purported united camp of the Left and the Jews strictly behind it. 
Apart from numerous obstacles and setbacks from the very beginning (some of 
the OZN officials tried to undermine ONR-Falanga activists’ influences), the 
ZMP grew in size claiming 40 thousand in the fall of 1937, and over 60 thousand 
in the spring of 193840. However, after attacks from the left of the Sanacja regime, 
the ‘chief of the nation’ Marshall Edward Rydz-Śmigły resolved to end 
cooperation with the nationalist radicals and forced them, at least the cream of the 
crop, to resign. On April 22 1938, Rutkowski and his close fellows left the ZMP, 
which alongside Bolesław Piasecki’s own defeat to gain real political power in 
the state is always conjured up as a typical failure of East European fascists to 
take power in an environment dominated by conservative authoritarians. But how 
did matters look in the Lublin voivodeship? Interestingly enough, the ZMP, as the 
young organization of OZN still growing via systematically recruiting new 
members, acquired its main influences in the city Lublin and only in some 
districts of the voivodeship (e.g., in the Garwolin district or in Zamość). The 
organization did not give up the intention to take on the trappings of the other 
fascist, or para-fascist organizations. The ZMP member donned a paramilitary 
uniform and was expected to accept a hierarchical form of leadership. The ZMP 
from the very beginning proceeded with frenzy in rivalry with the other radical 
rightist groups for a government of souls among the younger generation. The 
organization conducted an anti-Jewish boycott until the outbreak of WWII and 
actively took part in state-sponsored acts of violence against other minorities (like 
the Ukrainians). Alongside with the army in eastern part of the voivodeship the 
ZMP was the major force in implementing the ethnic cleaning policy against the 
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Ukrainians and Orthodox local communities which began in the spring of 1938 
under the banner of ‘national consolidation’41. For example, in February 1939 the 
organization forced the state inspectorate to segregate the Jewish pupils from the 
‘Christians’ in Garwolin schools into separate branches. On the eve of WWII the 
ZMP was if not the largest, surely the most influential youth organization in the 
region.  
A special role in building a consensus within the national community on 
the riddance of the ‘Other’ was played by the Polish Catholic clergy or even 
Catholic Church as such, which coupled popular nationalism with anti-Semitism 
and xenophobia with anti-Orthodox attitudes. This arose from the long-term 
vision for the Polish nation and state, which itself was deeply tied to the clergy’s 
belief that it occupied and should occupy a special position in Polish society. 
After the formation of the Second Republic both the Catholic Church as a whole 
in the Lublin province and the most Catholic clergy of the region wholeheartedly 
supported an idea of the ‘Catholic State of Polish Nation’ (Katolickie Państwo 
Narodu Polskiego). In that sense of the word, the Catholic clergy, but also 
popular Catholic opinion, could not promote the vision of the nation on the basis 
of legal equality, which meant that non-Catholics, not mentioning the Jews and 
even non-ethnic Poles such as Ukrainians, could not be genuine ‘Poles’. The Jews 
from the very beginning were the pivotal element in this hierarchy of foes. For 
centuries, the Polish Jews, by and large, not only had remained culturally and 
socially distinct, but moreover constantly rejected conversion to the true-faith-
Catholicism. Not surprisingly, after the re-establishment of Poland after over 123 
years of partitions, the Catholic Church considered the ‘Jews’ as an eternal 
outsider, a foreign folk that willingly separated itself from other ‘Christian 
societies’. The position of the Church in eastern parts of the country, where 
national and religious minorities and groups had lived side by side for centuries, 
and the hegemony of Catholicism was neither obvious nor easy to maintain, 
seemed to be, however, even more fragile. It is also important to keep in mind 
that this discourse of Church-nation identification also derived from the clergy 
itself with its perception of Catholicism as the genuine defender of the Polish 
ethnic community. From a socio-cultural perspective, the Lublin clergy perceived 
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itself as the soldiers of the ‘Polish cause’ and the Church as a bastion of 
Polishness on the eastern borders42. It is no wonder that for first rector of the 
Catholic University of Lublin was appointed Rev. Józef Kruszyński, one of the 
most aggressive Catholic pamphleteers and vitriolic anti-Jewish writers of the 
time43. 
In early 1930s two social-economic processes affected this often-
mentioned outlook. On one hand, the Great Depression struck the Catholic clergy 
like any other segments of intelligentsia. Moreover, local priests had to maintain 
their parish churches, cemeteries, and other religious properties, and at the same 
time contribute monies to the curia for its needs, pay state taxes, and support their 
parishes’ religious, social, and last but not least charitable activity. If the 
hierarchy, thanks to its social and economic position, did not worry much about 
its personal material needs, local priests, especially newcomers found it difficult 
to fulfill all these obligations because their salaries were relatively low and they 
could not rely on their parishioners for contributions, particularly in the period 
1930-1935 of intense economic hardship. On the other hand, in regions like the 
Lublin province where the priesthood remained to the vast majority of populace 
the only accessible way to social advancement and emancipation, economic and 
ideological issues were bound up inextricably. In this situation, a multitude of 
lesser clergy began to give its acceptance to radical rightist politics. 
Thus, especially after Piłsudski’s death in 1935, the Lublin Catholic 
Church and its functionaries felt under threat, and indefatigably attacked all such 
‘mortal evils’ as every form of secularism, liberalism not mentioning socialism 
and communism on the basis that they actually believed these were permanent 
threats to the Polish nation and its mission. Yet as a diocesan publication such as 
Lublin Diocesan News (Wiadomości Diecezjalne Lubelskie) even tried to distance 
the Church from aggressive actions, the periodical constantly reported on 
‘Jews…tendency toward revolution, cheating, and swindling’44.  
The most outstanding example of this ‘holy’ alliance with the nationalists 
and the Sanacja was the widespread participation of the Catholic clergy both in 
the anti-Jewish boycott in the region and then enthusiastic support for eliminating 
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over the 100 ‘superfluous’ Orthodox churches in 1938 in the eastern part of the 
Lublin voivodeship.  
 
Résumé 
To sum up, it has been assumed here that this fascist sub-culture of anti-
Jewish terror which was imported into almost every part of the Polish countryside 
(with some significant exceptions) and doubtlessly had far reaching consequences 
during WWII and immediately afterwards. In the province, such in the Kresy 
demolished almost completely ambivalent symbiosis among ethnic and religious 
groups and led them at the eve of WWII to extremely polarized and antagonistic 
state of affaires. In interwar Poland in contrast to Germany and Italy but as well to 
Romania and Hungary the nationalist right after 1935 remained much 
heterogeneous in nature and in institutional shape, that means e.g. that any one 
single, political leader reached dominant position to prevailed the whole rightist, 
or even only nationalist scene. Moreover, the popularity enjoyed by each leader 
appeared broader than it really was. The most dynamic personality of the ONR-
Falanga, Bolesław Pisasecki, the only party leader who seems to have 
appreciated this possibility, remained only a kind of a student’s nationalist 
movement spokesman. Yet fascism as such was always a movement of youth and 
because of that was able to obtain its particular revolutionary impetus. On the 
other side, if it would be successful, it had not to be only a youth movement. 
Other radical leaders – e.g. such as Adam Doboszyński and Kazimierz 
Kowalski of the largest National Party (SN) or Jan Mosdorf a co-founder of ONR 
exercised some power at local level while remaining almost unknown at national 
level. The radical nationalist youth had gained a tremendous influence in its own 
generation but failed to win direct political power in the state. All in all, the 
fascism as a political and socio-cultural movement did not score such tremendous 
political results in the other countries but in fact overshadowed political life in the 
whole country. Most of all it was an effect of consequent years of agitation that 
slowly became transformed into more sophisticated ‘political-social engineering’ 
as Kamil Kijek named it45. Violence was used by the ‘Young’ to promote their 
city born and based ideology at the country side, to the first generation of 
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peasants socialized in the Polish Second Republic, first that was studying in 
Polish national schools and was receptive towards ideas of radical, ethnic 
nationalism and the pure community. The Polish ‘Young’ version bore important 
similarities to European fascist movements and right wing political modernism 
such as utopia of organic ethno-nation, total reorganization of institutions 
governing societies, deep feeling of degeneration of the current world, cult of 
uniform, military discipline and organization, obedience and physical power. 
Finally, central for ideology and praxis of the ‘Young’ was issue of political 
violence or even the utopia of terror. Inseparably connected with violence was not 
only paramilitary organization of the ‘Young’, their inner-organisation of, and this 
kind of model of society and a everyday way of life that they had promoted. 
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Beyond “Objective Factors”,  
towards Political Mobilization and Radical Anti-Semitism:  





This article is based on a research on anti-Jewish violence in Kielce 
voivodeship from 1931 until 1936. 1  The best known event of this kind that 
happened in the area of central Poland was a pogrom (or as some prefer “Jewish-
Christian riot”) in Przytyk that took place on 9th of March 1936.2  This was 
preceded by the 20th-29th of November 1935 occurrences in Odrzywół and the 
19th-21st of June 1937 pogrom in Częstochowa.3 Besides, Kielce voivodeship 
had witnessed tens of other individual and collective anti-Jewish attacks that are 
scarcely known not only by wider public but still await their academic literature. 
There is still a large research gap concerning not only identification and 
description of many other events, still not discussed by scholarship, but also 
concerning proper genesis and explanation of these different events, which 
together lead to a wave of an anti-Jewish violence. The goal of this text is to 
formulate some new research perspectives for further research on anti-Jewish 
violence in Poland in the last decade before the Holocaust that can be derived 
from the case study of Kielce voivodeship. I will do that by presenting some new 
archival materials, a new reading of the existing academic literature, outlining 
some new research questions, propositions and guidelines for further research.  
 
Beyond general category of anti-Semitism and “objective” economic factors, 
toward fascism and radical anti-Semitism  
First of all, the progress in research demands the deconstruction of a few 
basic notions regarding the reasons for and the context of the interwar anti-Jewish 
violence. On the one hand, there is anti-Semitism as a single, uniform and 
encompassing factor. On the other hand, there are “objective” economic and 
structural causes of violence inflicted upon the Jews. My intention is not to claim 
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that various forms of prejudice or hatred against the Jews, the peculiar social 
structure of the Second Polish Republic, and the economic hardships do not 
matter here. They do matter, but in a different way than it has been understood so 
far. As it has been masterfully shown by David Engel, the category of “anti-
Semitism” in the political discourse of the 19th and 20th centuries could mean 
almost anything and everything. Likewise, if used unreflectively in scholarship, it 
could also explain almost anything.4 In the case of interwar Poland, anti-Semitism 
can be everything from traditional, pre-modern ethno-religious prejudice; through 
aversion to Jews as a modern political and national subject threatening the 
universal Polish nation and the power of the Polish state; up to the millennial or 
redemptive, modern and radical anti-Semitism.5 The latter should be understood 
as a modern Weltanschauung (rather than a strict, sophisticated ideology) – anti-
Jewish hatred in its most radical form. Its “millennial” character means that Jews 
were considered as an encompassing threat to almost all of the spheres of life of 
their non-Jewish neighbors. They threatened their morals and economic survival. 
They were both a hidden and an open enemy. They brought with them all of the 
calamities of modernity. Another important element of this kind of anti-Semitism 
is its open, or hidden, racial character. This kind of Weltanschauung was a 
modern phenomenon. It could utilize and cast anew old traditional forms of anti-
Jewish prejudice, such as, for example, the blood libel. But these “traditional” 
notions were always recycled, reworked and put into motion by the cultural and 
social forms of modernity – by the press and the propaganda of mass politics. 
They always acted in a modern social context. 
The above mentioned understanding of specific character anti-Semitism 
that indeed played crucial role in the events taking place in Kielce voivodeship in 
the years 1931-1936, was a particular Weltanschauung, or cultural code, 
characteristic of European political modernism, which swept across the continent 
and beyond. It was redemptive by calling for the radical break with the 
contemporary reality and a need of building new modernity, cleansed of its 
“Jewish features”. The politics of post-1933 Nazi Germany was only one of many 
fascist and other right wing manifestations of this kind of anti-Semitism present 
in the whole continent. Of course these manifestations differed very much, but 
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they had common, modernist, millennial and redemptive core. And this kind of 
radical anti-Semitism was characteristic for the biggest and the strongest Polish 
opposition party of the 1930s, the Stronnictwo Narodowe, or the National Party, 
popularly known as “Endecja” in Polish. This kind of a radical anti-Semitism had 
guided activities especially of the youngest generation of National Party and at 
the same time was a form of new, political ideology propagated by the modern, 
urban nationalistic movement in the Polish province and countryside. Only by 
understanding how this new, radical form of anti-Semitism was taught to 
Christian peasants and small, middle provincial town dwellers, how successful 
was its propaganda, we can understand the role of an another social and cultural 
factor of the anti-Jewish violence: Jewish and Christian socio-economic structure 
and impact of the 1929 Great Depression on the Polish countryside, very few 
possibilities of upward mobility, and finally, a collision of the old forms of anti-
Jewish prejudices with the parallel Jewish prejudices toward the Christian 
population. 
Radicalization of the Polish right wing movement, which went hand in 
hand with radicalization of its anti-Semitism, acquired a new dynamics after Józef 
Piłudski’s coup d’etat in May 1926. In the end of that year Roman Dmowski had 
established Obóz Wielkiej Polski (Camp of Greater Poland – OWP) that had 
acted next to National Democratic(“Endecja”) political party and gathered mainly 
the youngest and the most radical elements of the national movement. In the years 
of 1932-1933 OWP was disbanded by the authorities after the series of anti-
Jewish and anti-government violence conducted by its members. Most of them 
joined “Endecja” [now branded "Stronnictwo Narodowe" – National Party (SN)] 
and its special youth sections established to accommodate young radical activists 
coming from OWP. In the year 1934 the National Party faced a split when part of 
its most radical members had established a splinter political party “Obóz 
Narodowo-Radykalny” – ONR. The latter was delegalized by the authorities a 
few months after its establishment. Its activists continued their activities 
illegally.6 Nevertheless, in many regions of Poland, as in Kielce voivodeship, 
1934 SN-ONR party split was a marginal affair and the decisive majority of so 
called “Young”, whose most radical proponents of the national movement stayed 
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in the mother party and tried to implement their radical political ideas, enjoyed 
the privilege of acting in the framework of legal political organization.       
In Kielce voivodeship there were the Young who promoted most radical 
version of redemptive anti-Semitism. In their political propaganda Jews appeared 
as hidden rulers of Poland, “human trash”, “thieves” and “criminals”.7 In the 
propaganda of Young, more and more dominating the local National Party, they 
were presented in the manner of chimeric anti-Semitism; from one side as 
capitalist who brought the Great World Economical Crisis in 1929; from the other 
as “parasites” exploiting Poles in all the areas of social, economic and cultural 
life, killers of Polish nationalists; and lastly, as communists scheming to destroy 
Poland and Christianity. 8  To understand how far went the anti-Semitism of 
“Endecja” in the middle of the 1930s, during gradual radicalization of the party 
(which was not weakened by 1934 dissociation of ONR) and whole national 
movement we may also take a look beyond the Kielce province. In January 1935, 
the National Party Warsaw headquarters issued “Program for the candidate 
course” for the new recruits of the “Endecja”. They were taught all the elements 
of the most radical, redemptive anti-Semitism:  
 
“characteristic of Jews/ their national-religious organization aimed to rule 
the world/ impossibility of [their – K.K.] assimilation (...) Jews as state 
within a state. Mischievousness of Jews in social and political life of the 
nations/ demoralization of societies, decay of family, national and religious 
life, spreading of the class conflict, cluttering of the culture, crippling 
development of the host nations / Jews in economical life / [Their – K.K.] 
unproductivity, chain of economic intermediation, unfair competition, 
usury, black marketeering, tax avoidance, white trade, cocaine etc./ Jewish 
slogans: “progress”, “international brotherhood”, humanitarianism, capital. 
Secret associations/ enslaving and bribing of people, secret goals/ Fight 
with Jewry as national self-defense.”9 
 
From the very beginning of the 1930s the National Party’s anti-Jewish 
campaign was something much larger than just propagating boycott of the Jewish 
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economy and the “Polonization” of the Polish middle class. As it was phrased by 
Jan Zdzitowiecki, one of the all-Polish leaders of the Young, whose proclamation 
entitled “Young Movement” was reprinted in the newspapers of the national 
movement also in Kielce voivodeship, it was a fight with “Jewish disease”.10 
In order to understand the evolution of the Polish radical right wing politics 
of the 1930s, its growing influence in Polish province, including Kielce 
voivodeship, we need to turn to studies of fascism and radical political 
modernism that swept through Europe in the 1930s. The same as with the case of 
anti-Semitic ideology, this requires stepping down from the level of the history of 
ideas – the way in which most of the studies on right anti-Semitism in the Second 
Republic have been done so far – to the level of political culture and praxis. The 
functioning and the development of the fascist political culture in Poland cannot 
be attributed only to the nationalist radicals splinter party ONR that was 
established after its splintering from the National Party in 1934. Many, if not 
most, of no less radical Young stayed in the mother party and decided that they 
can more successfully ran their activities under the guise of legal political party. 
Especially in Kielce voivodeship, and what can have direct connection to the 
severity of anti-Jewish violence in this area, ONR was very weak since most of 
the Young decided simply to stay in SN. As it was reported to the state 
administration security authorities by the head of Częstochowa district in July 
1934, Stefan Niebudek, local leader of SN party, “heeds to the slogans of ONR. 
Program of his activities, despite that formally he does not belong to this camp, 
stems largely from its ideological and tactical guidelines”.11 A month before, he 
openly admitted to his followers that indeed his views are closer to ONR, but the 
national radical program has simply better chances for successful realization if the 
radicals are going to conduct its implementation as members of the legal political 
party. 12  Here of the outmost importance is the fact that a few months later 
Niebudek became member of the national board of “Endecja”, becoming one of 
the country leaders of the party. In 1935 one could have witnessed a dynamic 
raise of anti-Jewish violence in Kielce voivodeship, and local police authorities 
had no doubt that attacks on the Jews were committed by the members of 
114 
National Party at the same time sympathizing or even being in political contact 
with the Warsaw headquarters of the National Radical Camp.13 
Radical, redemptive anti-Semitism was not the only thing that linked many 
activists of National Party with that of ONR and attested to the deep fascist 
elements of their political culture.14 Another was their unbridled militarism and 
elevation of violence as the crucial form of political activity bringing national 
redemption. In local bulletin of National Party edited in Opatów, one of the 
district centers of Kielce voivodeship, physical confrontation of nationalists with 
communists or sympathizers of the Sanacja regime were means for “building 
strong characters, courage and physical strength”.15 In 1933 the Young of Kielce 
region, while establishing their autonomy in the framework of National Party, 
organized their “youth sections” according to the rules of “militarized 
discipline”. 16  In September 1935 as it was reported by Kielce voivodeship 
authorities: 
 
National Party – taking advantage of dire economical situation and raising 
anti-Semitism of urban populations had organized anti-Jewish boycott. 
This action will be developed in October. National Party does its best to 
popularize the national idea. One of its propaganda tricks that is supposed 
to attract the masses is to introduce uniforms for the members of the party, 
associating uniform with the notion of strength.17 
 
According to this line, the party organized its massive gatherings, like for 
example dedication of its new banner in Radom on 6th of October 1935 or 
marches organized on 1st of September 1935 in Częstochowa, which were first of 
all manifestations of paramilitary and physical strength. In the former 200 people 
strong “military unit” (oddział) marched in three groups, each under its own 
banner. After the mass in local church, marcher were adressed by one of 
Częstochowa nationalist leaders talking about their banners as “stained with the 
blood of our comrades killed by Jews in their fight for national cause”.18  In 
January 1936 local leaders of National Party received orders to organize military 
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drills for the party members.19 According to the report of voivodeship office on 
security situation in the region in February 1936:  
 
Agitation creates state of permanent and growing excitement of the society, 
which National Party tries to transform into readiness to fight that would 
give party authorities possibility of instant mobilization of mob against 
Jews or security forces in case of any disturbances. National Party leaders 
recommend organizing party cells according to military patterns, during 
“briefings” party leaders are greeted with the “attention!” command, they 
receive reports in military manner.20 
 
Further steps in militarization of the party were taken also in the spring of 
the same year. 21  How elements of fascism, radical anti-Semitism, close 
connections between some of the National Party and the National Radical Camp 
members were interconnected, was proved also by an event taking place during 
June 1936 trial in Radom of Christians and Jews engaged in Przytyk pogrom and 
Christian-Jewish riots. The main defender of the accused Christians was 
Kazimierz Kowalski, so called maximalist that was representative of the most 
radical elements in National Party, who in 1939 became its last interwar 
president. During the trial, the activists of former ONR organized illegal march in 
front of the Radom court. Kowalski marched hand in hand with national radicals 
in their paramilitary uniforms, organized in the rows of 4 people each. Marchers 
carried their illegal party banners, shouting “down with the Jews!”, they clashed 
with the police and beaten the Jewish inhabitants of the town.22 
In order to understand the impact of the European fascism on ideological 
development in Polish national movement we need to study the impact that 
Hitler’s rise to power in Germany had on the political imagination of the Polish 
right-wing opposition, especially on the Young generation of the national 
movement. It is important to note that the dominant Polish historiography of 
Endecja in interwar Poland concentrates on showing a clear distinction between 
the non-Christian, racial nationalism of the Nazis and the “Catholic nationalism” 
of the National Democrat establishment, or at least its older variety. 23  This 
116 
distinction may hold true on the level of the official, central party press. But the 
situation looks different if we compare what was said during party rallies and 
conferences with what was published in the party press. Kielce voivodeship 
example demonstrates that at least in the realm of program of policy towards 
Jews, the impact of the German national socialist example on the Polish right 
wing was much greater than most of the recent historiographies tend to admit.  
For example, on 2nd of April 1933, during the county gathering of the 
National party in the town of Jędrzejów, catholic priest Adam Błaszczyk – a 
deputy of the Sejm and an important National Party leader in the Kielce region – 
discussed Hitler’s anti-Jewish measures “as worth of praise and following”.24 
This was not an isolated incident. The German model was called upon in various 
local meetings and in the local press by “Young” as well as “Old” members of the 
National Party. The very same positive things about Nazi prosecution of the Jews, 
supplemented with satisfaction with observation of similar surge of radical anti-
Semitism also in Poland, were said by Stefan Sołtyk, a leader of the nationalist in 
the Radom area (where Przytyk pogrom took place), on the gathering of the 
National Party activists on 9th of April 1933. 25  An interesting source of 
information is in this case “Gazeta Narodowa”, the main organ of the national 
movement in Kielce voivodeship published in the years 1932-1939, edited by the 
leaders of the Young, Stefan Kowalski (who in 1939 became a leader of National 
Party) and later on by Stefan Niebudek.26 Throughout all of the late spring and 
summer 1933, to its usual reports on daily Jewish misdeeds in cities, towns and 
villages of the area it had added very favorable reports on that how “the Jewish 
problem” was firmly dealt in Hitler's Germany. For example, on 4th of June 1933 
after the title page editorial about “4 million (sic!) of Jews taking bread from 4 
million Poles” it informed about the Alfred Rosenberg’s “anti-Semitic university” 
bringing eager students from all over Europe.27 On 25th of June reported on the 
meeting of the National Board of “Endecja” that took place two weeks before, 
from which it quoted speech of one of the National Party main economic experts, 
Roman Rybarski. According to his opinions, Hitler’s drastic measures in the 
internal politics were strengthening Germany and thus, German threat in the 
future. In order to curb this threat, Poland should follow this example in its own 
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internal politics, among many other steps, by developing Polish commerce in 
expense of the Jewish one, by ideological “national consolidation”, by reducing 
numbers of Jews in schools, important professions and administrative positions.28 
On 9th of July “Gazeta Narodowa” continued with its favorable reports on next 
anti-Jewish legal measures introduced by the Nazis.29 Finally, on 1st of October, 
after series of acts of anti-Jewish violence in Częstochowa in summer of 1933, 
among them an attempt of murder of local Jewish journalist by the National Party 
activist, followed by the arrest of 42 young nationalists, newspaper proudly 
reported that no one else as the head of Nazi Germany propaganda machine 
Joseph Goebbels praised the nationalists “fight against the Jews” in Częstochowa 
and condemned their arrests.30 This kind of enthusiasm towards prosecution of the 
Jews in Nazi Germany was not only limited to the year 1933. On 18th of February 
1935, during the discussions on the reorganization of the local branches of 
“Endecja” that was held in Radom, one of the discussants had said: “National 
camp, observing how today Jews are fraternizing with the Sanacja regime, should 
take fight against the Jews into its own hands and bring the same results as they 
were achieved by Hitler”.31 In a few other localities of the voivodeship, its leaders 
were talking about “solving the Jewish issue in a radical way, following example 
of Hitler’s Germany, which will bring rapid decrease in unemployment”.32 On 
28th of January 1936 in the village Kuźnicze during the meeting of the local 
members of the “Endecja” Władysław Majer, one of the party leaders from 
Częstochowa, foretold Polish nationalists gaining power in Poland as Hitler had 
done in Germany and then follow his example.33 As it was pronounced day later 
on another SN party meeting: “The best way to dejudaize Poland is to do what 
Hitler did in Germany”.34 It is also important to note that these positive views on 
Hitler’s Germany policies against the Jews were not a local phenomenon. They 
were explicitly expressed in the official party communiqués issued by the 






Beyond “economic boycott” – social engineering of violence  
Fascist right wing modernism, ideas of militarization of society, its violent 
reconstruction through struggle with external and internal enemy, with radical, 
millennial anti-Semitism in its very center have decisively urban provenance, as 
they were firstly developed and endorsed by the urban intelligentsia. In the Polish 
case, it is therefore no surprise that in the 1930s the first sites of outburst of the 
organized anti-Jewish violence driven by millennial anti-Semitism were Polish 
universities.36 How then could this urban, modernist ideology be promoted in the 
very different social context of the Polish province? How was the Catholic 
peasant able to view his traditional Jewish neighbor as both a Bolshevik threat 
and a Wall-Street capitalist, as the one who spread sexual degeneration and 
destroyed Polish intelligentsia? In Kielce voivodeship, the promotion of this kind 
of millennial anti-Semitism was achieved by the means of a complex political 
program.  
First, the issue of the economic boycott of the Jews had been implemented 
by Endecja as its systematic policy from 1931. By relying on the official 
declarations of the National Democrats, some historians are able to corroborate 
the picture of the boycott as separate issue than the physical attacks upon Jews.37 
Indeed, this was the picture created by a part of the official National Democratic 
press, as advocating the violence was illegal. Cases of dissolution of the Camp of 
Great Poland (OWP) in the years of 1932-1933, followed by the dissolution of the 
National Radical Camp (ONR) in 1934 and a similar threat faced by the National 
Party (SN) in 1936 – in all cases largely because of an engagement of their 
member in physical violence against Jewish population of the country – excluded 
the possibility of placing open calls to violence in official right wing press. The 
story was different in the case of leaflets and posters. Violence, including the anti-
Jewish variety, radical anti-Semitism, together with militarism, modernist 
catastrophism, longing for an ultimate sacrifice, belief in a thorough degeneration 
of the modern world, and the “sense of a new beginning” – all of these features of 
right-wing European fascist modernism – filled out unofficial publications of 
national movement and various public speeches of its activists. Calls for 
economic boycott of the Jews were only one of many anti-Jewish elements 
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present in the rhetoric and the activities of the national movement in Kielce 
voivodeship. The Endecja press and other official publications promoted a 
radical, millennial anti-Semitism. Undoubtedly, the daily promotion of this kind 
of Weltanschauung was an important factor strengthening the potential for the 
emergence of physical violence. But it was not the only factor and not a sufficient 
one. In the Kielce region, what triggered the violence that led not only to the 
events in Przytyk, but also earlier ones in Odrzywół, Krzepice, Truskolasy, 
Przysucha, Radom, Opoczno, Opatów, Częstochowa and the surrounding 
countryside, was a deliberate political program and organized activity, which can 
be branded as a social politics or a political communication through violence.  
Violence was an inseparable part of the anti-Jewish boycott campaign. It 
had an unofficial, but an important character. Already in 1932 nationalist youth 
had attacked Jews on the streets of Kielce and Dąbrowa Górnicza. In their internal 
meetings, the local activists of the National Party were admitted that their 
organization stood behind these occurrences.38 Anti-Jewish violence had acquired 
much greater dynamics in the next year. Częstochowa, Radom and Włoszczowa 
districts in late spring and summer of 1933 were visited by the special student 
delegations from Poznań that recruited young people for fight with Jews and the 
ruling Sanacja regime. 39  In July 1933 leaders of the Young in Częstochowa 
discussed possibility of buying guns in the wake of upcoming “national 
revolution”. “Fighting squads” of the National Party were trained in military and 
street fighting tactics. In the same month, a few of the Częstochowa members the 
party were arrested for attacking Jewish passerby on the streets of the city.40 At 
this time their leader Stefan Niebudek was trained in Poznań in “organization of 
the anti-Jewish disturbances”. Anti-Jewish action was planned as a first stage of 
anti-government coup.41 In the other places of the Kielce region, the National 
Party was distributing anti-Jewish leaflets, its members were collecting arms, 
organizing into fighting groups and beating the Jews.42 Slogans used by the party 
propaganda used arsenal of radical, redemptive form of anti-Semitism. They 
informed about “Jewish blood-suckers”, threatened of “Judeo-communism”, and 
called for end of the “Jewish exploitation” and “Jewish slavery”, finally they 
included opened calls to beat Jews.43 At this time, the Young in Częstochowa and 
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Kielce were organizing anti-Jewish attacks in order to test military readiness and 
efficiency of their fighting squads for their future confrontation with the 
authorities.44 In August of 1933 a general intensification of a violent anti-Jewish 
campaign in Częstochowa came together with murder attempt on a local 
journalist David Altman whom nationalist considered as their arch local enemy.45 
The wave of the anti-Jewish violence continued in Kielce voivodeship in 
1934, although with lower dynamics, and then rose again in 1935. In the early 
spring of that year the most discussed topic during the gatherings of National 
Party, was concerning “fight with Jews”.46 In April 1935 leaflets and posters were 
distributed that called for economic boycott, for beating and even “finishing with 
the Jews”.47 In September 1935, during parliamentary elections young nationalists 
tried to organized anti-Jewish disturbances in Częstochowa. During the arrests 
police was confiscating knuckle-busters, knives and clubs.48 Lesser indicants of 
that kind took place also in Radom, Kielce and Truskolasy in the same and again 
in Radom in the next month.49  The most drastic events took place in Opoczno 
district, in the market town of Odrzywół and its surrounding villages, where 
things gotten out of control of the leader of the National Party. In Odrzywół, 
Young radicals, as it seems overstepping directives coming from above, 
unleashed a wave of anti-Jewish violence that was supposed to lead to instant 
“national revolution”. New peasant members of nationalist organization were 
convinced by the Young that this kind of revolution would take place all over the 
country, would be joined by military and would overthrow the Sanacja 
government. The apogee came between 20th and 29th of November 1935, when 
the attacks on the Jewish stall keepers during the market day were organized. The 
clashes with the police and the arrests brought death of 12 peasants and 25 
wounded. It is important to note that almost all of the villagers killed in these 
events and tens prosecuted in the trial that followed the events were not simply 
“peasants” but members of the National Party.50 A very similar anti-Jewish riots 
as this one were organized in Odrzywół on 20th of November 1935, which were 
close to materialize in few other towns of the region. Agitation and individual 
beatings of the Jews took place in towns and villages of the Kielce voivodeship 
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on a daily basis during this and next month, again, attributed mostly to the 
National Party and ONR.51 
In January 1936 local authorities were reporting that militancy of the 
National Party propaganda, its call for physical confrontations with the Jews and 
authorities, was the main factor raising its popularity in the Kielce voivodeship 
villages.52 One of the most spectacular events of this kind was a fully blown 
pogrom organized by SN “Young” activists in Truskolasy, Kłobuck and Krzepice 
in Częstochowa District on 27th of January 1936. It was preceded by bomb 
detonation under the synagogue in Truskolasy on 18th of January and an attempt 
of setting up fire under the prayer house in nearby Miedźno two days later. On 
27th of January activists of the National Party faked the desecration of the 
Truskolasy church by local Jews, called for revenge and attack the Jewish 
participants of local fair, leaving tens of them wounded and their property 
destroyed.53 Again, in this case as in other cases of anti-Jewish attacks, authorities 
had no doubts who stood behind them, and that they were elements of a general 
political action undertaken in the whole region that in the end looked for toppling 
of the Sanacja regime.54 In the district of Radom, where two month later Przytyk 
incidents took place, according to the security department of the voivodeship 
office:  
 
Action had taken massive character to the extent that there is no place 
which would be free from any kind of anti-Jewish excess and Jewish 
population is so heavily boycotted that in some localities it had lost all 
basis of its economical existence. Majority of National Party cells in the 
district had created fighting squads whose goal is to surround Jewish shops 
and not to let in Polish buyers. In addition, special action will be 
undertaken against these who decide to buy merchandise from the Jews. 
Merchandise and clothes of buyers will be destroyed, they will be 
ridiculed.55 
 
Just in March 1936, only in Radom district, police had registered 76 
incidents between Jews and Christians.56 
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Nation or nationalist? 
At the same time, in its official documents, the National Party tried to speak 
Aesopian language, on the one side suggesting that it stands in vanguard of the 
opened struggle and physical fight with the Jews, on the other stating that anti-
Jewish attacks were spontaneous, and unprovoked activity of the masses. This 
image has also dominated contemporary historical literature on the topic. An 
illustrative example of this case is a manuscript explaining the 16th of February 
1936 elections to the General Council of National Party that was passed hand in 
hand between its activists in Kielce. Let us note that this situation took place just 
after an eruption of massive anti-Jewish violence in the region, culminating in 
Odrzywół riots, pogroms in Truskolasy, Przysucha, Krzepice, tens of individual 
violent attacks on the Jews across the whole region and just before the Przytyk 
pogrom. The document underlined political priorities that were “fight with 
internal enemy allied with the communist movement” and militarization of the 
Polish nation. In its final part document included following statement:  
 
Most vivid phenomenon of our current political life is powerful, lively but 
until now not yet sufficiently politically organized anti-Jewish sentiment of 
wide masses, with villagers playing increasingly important role (...) Of 
thousands of [anti-Jewish – K.K.] incidents only few reach the news (...) 
Today this Jewish wall separating Polish society is crumbling under more 
and more frequent hammer strikes. These strikes are not isolated things, 
they can be heard all over the country and nothing can stop them, because 
they do not come from one party but are inflicted by nation, by all its 
classes. These strikes are symptom of awakening and understanding that 
this wall needs to be destroyed in order to regain full national strength.57 
 
The document continued with enthusiastic noticing of “fight with the 
Jews” undertaken by artisans, workers, peasants and intelligentsia, nevertheless 
noting that dynamics of this fight was still too low and should be raised. At its 
end, national leaders of the party set its goals, observing that especially youngest 
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generation of the Poles was the one that could have been convinced that 
overriding political goal of the era was confronting the Jewish menace.58 
It is striking that against all what was written above and against vast 
archival evidence the author of the only book monograph of Przytyk events, in 
fashion similar to some other historians quoted in footnotes above, tried to prove 
that boycott action of the National Party had nothing to do with anti-Jewish 
violence. Piotr Gontarczyk, using materials of the same archives that were 
researched for the need of this text, had ignored all of the above mentioned 
evidence. The way in which he dealt with the National Party action aimed to stop 
selling of the wood from Radom district to the mills owned by the Jews is 
characteristic. The party activists had many times physically attacked cart drivers 
and peasants working for the Jewish business. According to Gontarczyk this had 
nothing to do with anti-Jewish action of the National Party (!) and the authorities 
were to be totally mistaken in their opinions concerning obvious meaning of the 
affair: “peasants were Poles, members of the National Party, and mill belonged to 
the Jew. I wonder how finesse would be the officials if, owner of the mill, lets 
say, was a Belgian. Would we have anti-Flamand or anty-Walonian incidents?”.59 
With this absurd sentence, a Polish historian tried to cover obvious meaning of 
what had happened. Grabowy Las was a state wood that sold its resources to a 
few local mills owned by Jews. The National Party, in the framework of its 
general Jewish boycott action, tried to stop this economic relation. Here, exactly 
as it was in almost all cases before, violence was inseparable part of the boycott. 
SN action started in the end of January 1936. From the very beginning it was 
performed not by uncharacterized “peasants” but by local peasant members of the 
party. Its main elements were attacks, beating card drivers and throwing out wood 
that they were carrying to the Jewish mills. There were more than 10 cases of 
such actions between the end of January and the end of February 1936.60 In the 
report sent to Ministry of Internal Affairs on 13th of March 1936 voivodeship 
office branded this as: “terrorist action performed by members of National 
party”.61 
The effects of violence were to serve as kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Jews were to be attacked. They would defend themselves by appealing to the state 
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authorities or by direct physical self-defense. Interventions by the authorities were 
to be presented as proof of the Sanacja regime “serving the Jews.” Any anti-
Jewish attacker wounded or killed in the attacks was to be cast as a martyr. This, 
in turn, would serve as another form of direct “proof” of Jewish aggression. Such 
a course of events was supposed to take place in crowded areas, fairs where the 
large numbers of peasants convened were be ideal. Physical confrontation 
conducted in such places would inevitably create confusion, chaos, and 
involvement of the bystanders. It would also make use of the prevailing 
traditional ethno-religious divide. A fight between “Jews” and “Polish Catholics” 
would inevitably bring more and more peasants on the side of the latter. To 
strengthen this phenomenon, the National Democrat Young would look for the 
support of the provincial Catholic clergy. Finally, the ongoing situation would be 
explained to peasants in the categories of millennial anti-Semitism and the 
general Endecja ideology. In this way, it would finally get a stronger hold on the 
Polish countryside and gain the status of a self-fulfilling prophecy. As it was 
discussed in Radom in 1934, members of SN fighting squads, together with SN 
sympathizers proficient in violence: 
 
“were to provoke fights with Jews, which the peasant population should 
especially be dragged into. That is to be done through agitation during the 
fairs (…) because those arrested [after fights – K.K.] will mainly be 
Christians, bitterness will spread among Polish society, and hostile 
attitudes toward the government that is defending the Jews will arise.”62 
 
Another element of this plan was, as it was pronounced in Częstochowa 
during board election of the local branch of the National Party on 30th of May 
1935:  “dragging priests to our actions, and even unmasking them in front of the 
police”. The authorities would then start to suppress Catholic priests and this 
would surely bring support for the nationalist cause.63 
In this way, Endecja’s ideology started to become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, finding its confirmation in “facts,” and as such, it was now easier to 
promote among the peasants. 64  We should bear these two examples of 
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sophisticated National Party social policy and agitation in mind not only when we 
look at the case of Przytyk, but also when we look at other more and lesser known 
cases of collective anti-Jewish violence. Anti-Jewish violence rose from 1931, 
reached its peak first in 1933 and remained high in 1934, dropped slightly in the 
first half of 1935, rose again after parliamentary elections in the second part of 
this year, and reached its second peak just prior to the events of March 1936 in 
Przytyk.65 
It is important to note that the violence continued and the National Party 
faced a growing threat of repression from the state, its leadership increasingly 
stressed the need for presenting the violence as having a spontaneous appearance, 
somehow “naturally” manifested by peasants and city dwellers. Instigating the 
violence, at the very same time, nationalist activists tried to conceal any proofs 
that could point them as its organizers.66 Official publications were constantly 
“winking” their eyes to their readers over the heads of the censorship and legal 
authorities. Such “reading between the lines” should be kept in mind when we 
read the official SN publications. And they always need to be juxtaposed with the 
reports of the district chief (starosta), the provincial governor (wojewoda), and 
the police; with leaflets, posters, memoirs, and so on. In the words of the circular 
of the National Party executive of August 1933, anti-Jewish excesses should 
always appear as if they were “coming out not from national, but from Catholic 
youth.”67 
Exactly the same strategy of Aesopian language was used by the Christian 
perpetrators defense lawyers during Odrzywół and Przytyk trials, both held in 
June 1936. All of them, more than dozen altogether were leading activists of the 
National Party. They tried to protect their organization from possibility of legal 
prosecution for organizing and instigating illegal violence, claiming that it was 
spontaneously performed by “the people”. At the same time they were eye 
blinking to their followers, suggesting that they were the true leaders of “anti-
Jewish struggle”.  
During Odrzywół trial one of the National Party lawyers stated that 
destruction of Jewish stalls 20th of November 1935 was the effect of “raising 
patriotism” and that police made mistake arresting those who had made it. This 
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was followed by the statement of his colleague who used his position of defense 
lawyer to present passionate outline of “Endecja” anti-Semitic ideology. He had 
defined anti-Jewish riots as “national illness”, instantly adding that “Jewish 
cancer is destroying us for centuries already.” Jews, as “unrelenting enemies” 
were themselves provoking anti-Jewish disturbances in order to force authorities 
to arrests Polish patriots, or killing patriots themselves. What had happened in 
Odrzywół was according to advocate Jezierski “reaction of ill organism who tries 
to heal himself, because it is not healed by the doctors.” While defending the 
accused in the characteristic, veiled manner, he actually admitted a crucial role of 
the National Party in Odrzywół events: “members of National Party did not stain 
themselves with robbery, they were conducting anti-Jewish activity, acting in the 
state of higher emergency. That is why I ask to acquit all of accused”. He was 
then followed by most known National Party lawyer, Kazimierz Kowalski, who at 
very beginning of his talk stated that “Jewish question needs to be resolved in our 
times. We need to free Poland from its fourth partitioner [reference to free 
partitions of Poland in the end of XVII century – K.K.]”. Another lawyer of the 
National Party, Stanisław Zdzitowiecki, was quoting notoriously an anti-Semitic 
weekly and organ of National Radicals – “Prosto z Mostu”, claiming that 
“incidents happen because society has a reflex reaction to Jewish flood, that had 
drowned our life, even our literature and culture.” At the same time he did not 
hesitate to bring forth example of Nazi anti-Jewish laws who had successfully 
defended Germany from the same threat.68 
Exactly the same kind of rhetorics was performed by National Party 
lawyers during the Przytyk trial. The trial itself, as well as tragic events of 9th of 
March 1936, deserves full academic study and critical reevaluation of what has 
been written on this topic so far. Here, I will just quote a few examples that 
present how worldwide notoriety of the trial was used by “Endecja” to promote 
its radical anti-Jewish ideas, claiming at the same time that they came from the 
Polish nation in general. “Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy” (Warsaw National 
Daily), a leading newspaper of the nationalist movement, in its issue from 10th of 
June 1936, next to its correspondence from Przytyk trial had placed the following 
sentence: “Fight to dejudaize [walka o odżydzenie – K.K.] Radom district 
127 
villages and towns is a fruit of National Party struggles, it is creation of last few 
months, it is a context of tragic events in Odrzywół and Przytyk”. In the same 
article newspaper informed with opened satisfaction that in Przytyk number of 
Jewish stalls dropped from 50 to 10, and 40 Christian stalls were established 
instead.69 An advocate Niedźwiedzki added that Jews in conscious and planned 
manner had provoked Przytyk incidents in order to curb successful boycott of 
their commerce. He had finished his speech with following words: 
 
“whole country is waiting for polonization of its commerce. We had lived 
to see independent Poland, but we still lack economical independence. 
What is happening now in Poland has an epochal meaning (…) I don’t 
know if we will live to see our full economical liberation. But our task is to 
start the process. Let the future generations finish what we have started”70.   
 
On 20th of June during one of the last days of Przytyk trial, Kazimierz 
Kowalski had diagnosed current situation in Poland as a state of open “Polish-
Jewish war”, quoted anti-Semitic publications proving centuries long Jewish 
scheming aimed in destroying Christian civilization, Jewish inspirations of both 
French and Russian October Revolution terrors, finally he had openly suggested 
who really stood behind tragic events anti-Jewish violence stating: “there, where 
the action is performed by camp of friends of the accused, there is no need of 
police protection.”71 
 
Instead of conclusion – ideas for further research  
The case of Kielce voiveodship in the years 1931-1936 proves how much 
research is still to be done on the political motivation and organization of anti-
Jewish violence in last decade of Interwar Poland. We still do not have its full 
map and description.72 Only after this initial stage of research, it should turn 
towards deeper “objective” reasons that stood behind violence. Surely, these were 
also important. The poverty of the countryside, a prolonged economic crisis and a 
lack of opportunities for village youth were all crucial factors. The village 
generation that came to adulthood in the 1930s was the first generation in Polish 
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history, the majority of whose members knew how to read (if not always to 
write), and was socialized in Polish state schools. They were the first generation 
to grasp the idea of an ethnically defined Polish nation, and could relate to the 
then-dominant idea of Poland as a state of the Polish nation, which should act in 
its interest. Research into this case of rapid cultural modernization of an 
economically backward social space, into the conditions of 1930s Polish and 
European political authoritarianism could bring very interesting results. 
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History as a Resource of the Populist Radical Right:  
The Long-Term Aftermath of Anti-Semitic Campaigns 
 
Haruka Miyazaki  
 
Since 2005, I have observed the course of discussion and changing 
evaluation of Roman Dmowski’s political thoughts and deeds. In the 2000s, when 
I began my research, Dmowski was generally recognized as a “black hero” in 
Polish history, or he was ignored as an infamous anti-Semite, though some 
political activists admired him as a “founding father of the Polish nation state.” 
Indeed, since the second half of the 1990s, Dmowski has been re-evaluated in 
more and more public ways. For example, in 1995, the Warsaw City Council 
decided to name the rondo in the center of capital after him (Rondo Romana 
Dmowskiego). In 2011, Narodowcy fixed the starting point of their independence 
day march (Marsz Niepodległości) in this rondo, cementing Dmowski as a patron 
of national movements.1 Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, a monument to 
Dmowski was built in the Plac Na Rozdrożu in Warsaw. This statue became a 
subject of criticism and was doused with paint several times. While protests said 
“Dmowski must tumble,” Narodowcy placed tribute flowers under the monument.  
Dmowski’s existence is also prevalent in publications, including Grzegorz 
Krzywiec’s Chauvinism, Polish Style: The Case of Roman Dmowski (Beginnings: 
1886-1905), which focused on his early thought and National Democrats from the 
viewpoint of the intelligentsia’s radical right nationalism at the turn of the 
century.2 On the other hand, in 2014, Dmowski’s works were edited again and 
introduced as an anti-Islamic nuance in the context of “the conflicts between 
European and Islamic civilizations.”3 At the same time, Dmowski’s thoughts 
began to influence political activities of populist radical right groups in Poland. 
These groups, such as Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny (ONR) and Młodzież 
Wszechpolska (MW), exploit historical resources from the heritage of National 
Democrats and Dmowski’s nationalism. What made the rise of populist radical 
right groups possible was, first of all, the re-evaluation of this historic figure who 
was ignored during the communist era. Second, after the accession to the 
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European Union in 2004, it seemed that the Polish society recovered the 
European-multicultural aspect of its identity. At the same time, however, it 
aroused the ethno-national aspect of its identity. On these bases, finally, refugee 
crises and nationalistic xenophobia, as a kind of expressions of anxiety, rose to 
the surface during the second half of the 2010s.4 Is it an externalization of 
deep-frozen anti-Semitism without Jews? Or has xenophobia changed its subject 
simply from Jews to other “strangers”? If we keep these questions in mind, we 
realize that Krzywiec’s paper is not only research on the history of political 
thought but also includes issues concerning recent controversy about Polish 
nationalism and Polish-Jewish relationships. Here I would like to pose a few 
questions, keeping in mind these historical issues’ relevance to the political debate 
in present-day Poland.  
 
The effects of the anti-Semitic campaign 
My first question is about the effects of the anti-Semitic campaign against 
non-Jewish people. Krzywiec pointed out that, since 1905, the political 
anti-Semitism of the Narodowa Demokracja, in opposition to leftists and 
progressivists, came to play a role in mobilizing a portion of the social strata in 
Congress Poland. 
The Endeks’ anti-Semitic slogans were not only applied to the whole of the 
Jewish community but also aimed at leftists, centrists, and conservative groups 
who engaged in compromise. In his election campaign during the 4th Russian 
Duma election of 1912, Dmowski attacked his Polish opposition even more than 
the Jewish population. However, at that time, Dmowski called his Polish 
opponents “Jewish puppets” and condemned them. In other words, the 
anti-Semitic campaigns did not only target Jewish communities but also sought to 
deprive Polish people and Jews of the opportunities to contact one another for the 
purpose of social exchange and collaboration. This included the denouncement of 
Polish people who were regarded as Jews, Polish people with Jewish parents, and 
Polish people who were deemed to be sympathetic to the Jews. Krzywiec pointed 
out that, in this sense, Dmowski's anti-Semitic campaign was successful. 
Similar situations can be seen in subsequent Polish history. For example, it 
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could be said that the situation in 1968 reflected the anti-Semitic campaigning of 
the 1910s. Of course, politicians in the 1960s did not engage in anti-Semitic 
pursuits to reproduce the circumstances from the 1910s. However, as a kind of 
resource of the 1968 campaign, could we not say that historical events were 
referenced by select similar cases? Will this sort of partial regression therefore 
occur in Poland in the future? An example of this can be found in 2006-2007, 
when circumstances involved the resurgent growth of the populist radical right. At 
that time, political parties and politicians in the political mainstream themselves 
maintained a conservative position but then accepted or promoted the activities of 
radical and extremist groups.5 
 
Was the sharing and advocacy of a monoculture possible?  
My second question regards the attitudes of the acculturated or integrated 
Jewish inhabitants in Polish society toward changes within the Jewish community 
after the 1905 revolution.6 According to Krzywiec’s paper, several important 
social changes occurred during the 1905 Revolution. First, there was the Jewish 
immigration from the Russian Empire to Congress Poland. Second, there was a 
sort of social and cultural revolution within the Jewish community in 
Russian-ruled Poland. In Warsaw and other cities of Russian-controlled Poland, 
Yiddish culture became popularized; Yiddish theater grew rapidly, and many 
Yiddish newspapers were established. 
Even faster than other Polish groups, the acculturated Jewish people 
reacted with surprise and disgust to these changes. Krzywiec pointed out that 
there was prompt antipathy toward the “Litvaks” of the Polish Jewish population. 
(The term Litvak was used as an epithet to refer to Jewish outsiders with Russian 
roots; this was essentially the only form of public discontent that could be 
publicly expressed toward Russia under the tsar.) 
Under these circumstances, what did the “acculturated Jewish people” 
assume of their own position? They must have thought about their social status in 
Russian-ruled Poland, as well as in the future independent Poland. If Poland 
would turn into a nation state according to Dmowski’s plan, then ethnic minorities, 




How feasible was Piłsudski’s federalism?  
My third question is about Józef Piłsudski’s federalism and its feasibility.  
Today, we know that the federalist plan of Józef Piłsudski ended in failure. 
In the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, various nationalisms were emerging 
at the turn of the century. Piłsudski's federalist plan is considered to have been 
unrealistic from today’s point of view. (Indeed, his vision was not realized.) It can 
be said that the reasons we evaluate it this way is a result of historical hindsight 
from our experiences in the 20th century. After World War I (and since 1989), the 
construction of nation states based on nationalism with ethnicity at the core 
became mainstream. 
If we do not think of it as an inevitable consequence of the incidents of the 
second half of the 20th century, how could one diagnose the circumstances in 
which Piłsudski lived? In other words, to what extent was his federalist plan 
feasible? Indeed, Piłsudski was “a man of contradictions” and “represented 
different things to different people.”7 However, it is clear that his attitude was 
distinctly different from those leading to political anti-Semitism in any cases. 
Piłsudski was born into a traditional Polish-Lithuanian aristocratic family, and in 
a sense maintained the character of a pre-modern politician. His fondness for the 
former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was well known. For that reason, for 
Piłsudski, “Poland” meant citizenship and civilization more than it did ethnicity 
and language. The multi-ethnic and multi-religious Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth disappeared in the 18th century, but its memory continued to live 
on in Polish romantic literature. It was also remembered in the armed uprisings of 
1830 and 1863. Piłsudski’s “civic nationalism” came from this background and 
was premised on the sharing of a broad political framework of Poland as well as a 
non-ethnic Polish consciousness.8 Therefore, the concept involved the formation 
of a federation of several smaller nations that was comparable to those in 




The Catholic Church 
My last question is about the role of the Catholic Church in Poland.9 What 
was the role of the Roman Catholic Church in popularizing the ideology of the 
Obóz Wielkiej Polski (OWP)?   
Krzywiec pointed out that Dmowski defended the Catholic Church because 
he found the church as an ally in a battle against Jewish power. According to 
Dmowski, Catholicism was the only power capable of undoing the influence of 
the Jewish spirit. Dmowski and the young members of OWP, who appeared as the 
new generation of nationalists in the 1920s, wanted to make their own 
nationalistic creeds that would demonstrate affection for Catholicism. It was in 
contrast to their predecessors, who were indifferent to religion. In this point, 
Piłsudski differed from them. He was against the idea of unifying church and 
nation (thought he formally became a Lutheran in his younger years).10 
Eventually, OWP could not obtain definitive support from the Catholic 
Church’s hierarchy, though many lower-level clergy supported the group. The 
church’s hierarchy kept a certain distance from the assertions of OWP. Even so, 
OWP’s ideas could penetrate the local congregations through the many 
lower-level priests to a certain degree. These priests had opportunities for daily 
contact with the congregations in the church and were thought of as familiar 
clergy. Could these members of the clergy have utilized the church as a medium 
for the ideology of OWP?  
This populist radical right ideology permeated into the Catholic culture to a 
certain degree. Can we find traces of this that remain in Poland today? These 
traces could be referred to as a historical “resource.” Since the start of the 2010s, 
it had seemed that Catholicism will probably take on a different political 
invocation from its position during the latter half of the 20th century. 
For example, on April 16, 2016, in the Białystok Cathedral, an infamous 
Catholic priest Jacek Międlar celebrated the mass on the occasion of the 
anniversary of the foundation of ONR. During the mass, he addressed the 
members of ONR, saying: “No toleration for Jewish cowardice... for Poland and 
Poles embracing malignant tumors, no toleration for such tumors. And this tumor 
need chemotherapy... The chemotherapy is uncompromising national-catholic 
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radicalism.” After the mass, ONR members went to the street to demonstrate with 
slogans such as “We don’t want violence in Poland, we don’t want aggression in 
the name of Allah, we don’t want rapes, we don’t want lynching, and we don’t 
want terror...,” which Międler uses frequently in his agitations.11  
If we compare this situation with the demonstration of “Generation of John 
Paul II,” we find a turbulent Polish-Catholic Church. The second half of the 20th 
century was an era in which we strongly set forth with inter-religious dialogues 
and strove to find reconciliation with those of the Jewish faith. However, it seems 
that some “imagined crisis” triggered a change in the sense of outsiders in Polish 
society. The presence of the above-mentioned priest is considered to have come 
with this shift. Then, what attitude will Catholicism take in the future regarding 
the overall situation? 
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Factors and Preconditions of Violence:  




In interwar Lithuania, large segments of commerce and industry were 
occupied by the Jews; therefore, Lithuanians – who desired to move from rural 
areas to cities – were not satisfied with the economic situation. Many Lithuanian 
scholars, who mention the background of the pogroms by Lithuanians and 
participation of Lithuanians in the Holocaust during the period 1941–1944, claim 
that such economic asymmetry was one of the major factors in the rise of 
anti-Semitism in the 1930s. There was a boycott campaign in Lithuania as well.   
However, I have always wondered why such anti-Semitic attitudes in the 1930s led 
to acts of violence at the beginning of the 1940s because I have believed that 
prejudicial assertions or propaganda and actual violence against the Jews belong on 
different levels. Therefore, I agree with Kijek’s claim that “millennial, radical 
anti-Semitism cannot – on its own – explain the emergence of actual acts of 
violence.” 
Kijek emphasizes that we need to focus on the multiple and compound 
factors of anti-Jewish violence, and he mentions the effect of ethno-nationalism as 
a meta ideology in interwar Poland. Ethno-nationalism is, of course, not peculiar to 
interwar Poland. In the era of nation-states, ethno-nationalism was dominant in 
many countries; moreover, it can be seen widely even today. As the political 
philosopher Will Kymlicka insists, even liberal democratic countries – where all 
citizens, including national minorities, are treated equally – cannot be 
ethno-culturally neutral.1 National minorities as groups are not on equal footing 
with the majorities in nation-states. 
Nevertheless, violence against national minorities or ethnic conflicts occurs 
only under specific circumstances. Although ethno-nationalism is still present, 
pogroms against the Jews are not so common as they were at the beginning of the 
20th century. Therefore, we need to focus on the kinds of factors that escalated 
ethno-nationalism into actual acts of violence, though they were, as Kijek points 
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out, compound. In the case study regarding anti-Jewish violence in interwar Poland, 
ethno-nationalism should be understood as a precondition or necessary condition 
rather than a factor causing violence. 
It is probably necessary to compare anti-Jewish violence with other cases, 
such as prejudice against Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities in interwar Poland, 
who were considered “potentially dangerous” (as were the Jews). Was there any 
violence against Belarusians and Ukrainians at that time? If so, what were the 
major differences between these and the anti-Jewish cases? Grasping the 
differences between cases against the Jews and those against other minorities is 
probably helpful for understanding how modern, millennial anti-Semitism and 
pre-modern, traditional ethno-religious prejudice functioned in acts of anti-Jewish 
violence. If there was no violence against Belarusians or Ukrainians, or if violence 
against them was not as harsh as violence against Jews, we need to consider why 
ethno-nationalism led to radical violence only against Jewish people. Kijek claims 
that “a deliberate political program and organized activity” triggered the violence. 
Was there an intent to carry out campaigns against Belarusians and Ukrainians as 
well? 
It is also important to consider the aim of Endecja and the reason for the 
group’s promotion of anti-Jewish violence, even though it ostensibly denied any 
physical attacks on the Jews. My second question addresses Endecja’s purposes 
and means. Was the group’s anti-Semitic promotion just a means to increase its 
political power against the Sanacja government (suggesting that anti-Jewish 
violence was not its purpose)? Or, did Endecja sincerely believe that Poland should 
have been a state without Jews? These questions may be important for 
understanding the characteristics of anti-Jewish violence. 
I suppose that, in Lithuania, anti-Semitic promotion was a means rather than 
a purpose for radical political movements, which had other purposes; later, 
however, persecution of the Jews gradually became the purpose. Is it possible that 
anti-Jewish promotion by Endecja also changed from a means to its purpose over 
time? 
Endecja was probably not a monolithic political group. There might have 
been differences in political views among its members. Kijek points to the 
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generation gap between “young” and “old” members of the National Party. He 
indicates that the former were more radical, but he also points out that both 
glorified the Nazi-German model and called for people to follow Hitler’s 
anti-Jewish measures. To what extent were the “young” members more radical than 
the “old”? What was the significant difference in their political views? Did the “old” 
members also become agitated and support violence against the Jews? Or, were 
they reluctant to do so? 
As more than a decade had passed since World War I and the independence 
of East-Central European countries, including Poland, generation gaps were often 
found in many countries in the region. In the 1930s, youth not only in Poland but 
also in other neighboring countries such as Germany required radical reforms. 
Generally, experienced or “old” political leaders in Lithuania in the 1930s still 
believed in a liberal democracy, though the youth were dissatisfied with the 
existing political system. This generation gap was one of the major factors in the 
radicalization of political movements in the late 1930s. I have noticed similarities 
in terms of radicalization among both Lithuanian and Polish youth, but I have not 
paid much attention to the generation gap between the Jews at that time. Therefore, 
I was very inspired by Kijek’s concept of “radical political habitus,” which can also 
be applied to Jewish youth. I suppose that there was a similar tendency toward 
radicalization among Jewish youth in Lithuania as well. 
Kijek points out that about 80% of the Jewish youth in Poland were educated 
in Polish state schools in the 1930s. In contrast, most Jewish youth in Lithuania 
were, as far as I know, educated in Hebrew or Yiddish private schools, which 
received subsidies from the Lithuanian government. The proportion of Jewish 
youth attending Lithuanian state schools was relatively small. Although many 
Jewish young people educated in interwar Lithuania learned the Lithuanian 
language and spoke it with Lithuanians, there were some Jews who believed that 
the Lithuanian language was not sophisticated or useful because it was the 
language of peasants. These Jews preferred to speak Russian or Polish with 
non-Jewish people. Therefore, the degree to which Jewish youth in Lithuania were 
acculturated and “Lithuanianized” might be different from the degree to which 
Jewish youth in Poland were. A comparison between the two groups is expected. 
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Kijek explains the “radical political habitus” of Jewish youth as follows: 
 
The more acculturated and Polonized Jewish youth had become, the 
more young Jews expected from the Polish state and the stronger 
they felt their exclusion and the rise of anti-Semitism. And thus, 
young Jewish people – more than the older generation – were 
interested in the defense of “Jewish honor” and with answering 
violence with violence. 
 
This explanation reminds me of the current situation of young Muslim 
minorities in Europe. As is generally well known, some second- and 
third-generation Muslim immigrants, who have acculturated to European culture to 
a greater extent than their parents and grandparents, feel alienated. Some young 
women show their “Islamic identity” by wearing veils, and young men do so by 
growing mustaches, joining radical Jihadist organizations, or conducting acts of 
terrorism, even though they have not been particularly religious and have had 
drinks. Thus, they are “more European” than their parents and grandparents. They 
are not traditionalists; rather, they are modernists. 
The political sociologist Christian Joppke compares policies on Muslim 
minorities that have been adopted in three European countries: France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom.2 According to Joppke, the policy in the United Kingdom 
has been based on multiculturalism, so communities of ethnic minorities have been 
able to preserve their cultures (so, in this sense, the United Kingdom is a 
“federation of cultures”3). In contrast, the policy in France has been based on 
republicanism and secularism (i.e., laïcité), so ethnic minorities have demanded to 
be integrated even in the private sphere. Joppke maintains that Muslim integration 
has been more successful in France than in the United Kingdom, but I feel that the 
modern phenomenon of the radicalization of Muslim youth is especially noticeable 
in France. Homegrown terrorism is still a grave problem in France and other 
countries. I suppose that such integrated or “Europeanized” Muslims may feel a 
sense of alienation and the rise of Islamophobia, as the Jewish youth in Poland “felt 
their exclusion and the rise of anti-Semitism” in the 1930s. 
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It is likely that the paradox of integration coinciding with exclusion is 
widely observed. Therefore, Kijek’s concept of “radical habitus” can be applied 
more generally to many other cases not only in East-Central Europe in the 1930s 
but also in other parts of the world or in other periods, including the present day. I 
firmly believe that this concept is useful not only in historical studies but also in 
other fields. 
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GK：実際には 1919 年ないし 1922 年に作られた「ファシズム」という語
を、それ以前の時代の事象について用いるのは避けたい。むしろ用いたい
のは、エルンスト・ノルテ（Ernst Nolte）やスタンリ ・ーペイン（Stanly Payne, 


































けることのできないものであったが、最近出版された大著、A History of 
Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe（Vol. 1: Negotiating Modernity 
in the 'Long Nineteenth Century', eds. Balázs Trencsényi, Maciej Janowski, 










きたい。私は自著（Chauvinism, Polish Style: The Case of Roman Dmowski 








れは失敗だった。本の元となった博士論文は “Roman Dmowski and Polish 

























































































































































Złoty słońca blask dookoła, 
 金色の太陽が輝きわたる 
Orzeł Biały wzlata wzwyż. 
 白鷲〔※ポーランドの国章〕が高く舞い上がる 
Dumne wznieśmy w górę czoła. 
 私たちは誇り高い額を上げよう 






Polsce niesiem odrodzenie. 
 私たちはポーランドをよみがえらせる 
Depcząc podłość, fałsz i brud.  
 卑劣、欺瞞、穢れをたたきのめして 
W nas mocarne wiosny tchnienie.  
 私たちの中には力強い春の息吹がある 
W nas jest przyszłość, z nami lud! 
 未来は私たちの中に、大衆は私たちと共にある！ 
  
Naprzód idziem w skier powodzi,  
 大洪水に逆らって私たちは進む 
Niechaj wroga przemoc drży. 
 敵は震え上がるがよい  
Już zwycięstwa dzień nadchodzi.   
 勝利の日はもう近い 

















































































































































Polish-Jewish Relations and Anti-Semitism in Interwar Poland 
Proceedings of the International Seminar 
Kyoto, January 7-8, 2018 
Edited by 
Yuu Nishimura and Mari Nomura 
 
First Published in 2018 
©2018 Yuu Nishimura, Mari Nomura and contributors  
 
Kanazawa University 
College of Human and Social Sciences  
Kakuma, Kanazawa, 920-1192 Japan 
